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ABSTRACT 
Judges limit antidiscrimination rights to cases involving purposeful 
discrimination. Recent social psychological evidence for “implicit 
bias,” however, shows that people injure others by discriminating even 
when they do not intend to do so. Advocates of the behavioral realism 
approach argue that such gaps between the assumptions judges 
inevitably make about human behavior when interpreting legal doctrine 
and available social scientific evidence should be closed or justified 
explicitly on other grounds. Closing the gaps, however, requires 
understanding why they developed and persist, so that an appropriately 
responsive strategy can be developed. This Article argues that the law-
science gap exists and persists in significant part because judges 
believe that they lack the ability to effectively remedy non-purposeful 
discrimination of the kind described by work on implicit bias and are 
unwilling to take the steps necessary to develop ways to do so. To 
illustrate, this Article reviews major developments in 
antidiscrimination doctrine related to discretionary decisions in two 
different domains—the death penalty and employment decisions—and 
highlights the role that judicial concerns about remedies plays in the 
opinions supporting those developments. In order to more effectively 
impact the doctrinal development in that area, this Article discusses 
concrete ways that the remedies understanding of the law-science gap 
can help guide social scientists, legal scholars, and advocates for 
expanded antidiscrimination rights. 
Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, 
  Or what’s a heaven for? 
  -Robert Browning1 
 
1 ROBERT BROWNING, ANDREA DEL SARTO, reprinted in ROBERT BROWNING: 
SELECTED POEMS 385, 395 (John Woolford et al. eds., 2013). 
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INTRODUCTION 
cholars working at the intersection of law and psychology often 
find that there are substantial gaps between what the science tells 
us about how people behave and the behavioral assumptions that are 
embodied in legal doctrine. One prominent example is the assumption, 
captured in procedural doctrine regarding who has the burden of proof, 
that eyewitnesses are generally reliable, particularly if they are 
confident in their identifications. By comparison, there is an enormous 
body of forensic psychological research demonstrating not only that 
eyewitnesses are frequently unreliable, but systematically so. When 
presented with evidence of this gap, a small number of courts have 
taken the step of affirmatively altering their procedural doctrine to 
better reflect the science.2 Others refuse to do so and instead follow the 
typical procedural and evidentiary rules but allow social scientists to 
testify as experts in particular cases about research on the limits of the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification.3 Finally, some who are skeptical 
 
2 Oregon and New Jersey have integrated modern psychological science into their 
doctrinal tests for witness reliability. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918–22 (N.J. 2011); 
State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685 (Or. 2012); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Judicial Innovations 
to Screen Eyewitness Identifications, 28 CRIM. JUST. 38, 39–40 (2013) (explicating 
Lawson’s approach to evidence law); see also Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of 
Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 723, 750–51 (2013) (citing Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685 and Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918–
22 as examples of courts “incorporat[ing] the new social science research into . . . 
reformulated standards for assessing eyewitness reliability”). Further, some states have 
modified their jury instructions about witness reliability based on modern science. See 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 916–18 (2015) (proposing model jury 
instruction); cf. State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1039 (Haw. 2012) (holding that modified 
jury instructions are an adequate remedy for informing juries of problems with eyewitness 
reliability). 
3 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 719 (2012) (“The rationale underlying this 
Court’s decisions, Perry asserts, calls for a rule requiring trial judges to prescreen eyewitness 
evidence for reliability any time an identification is made under suggestive circumstances. 
This Court disagrees.”); accord Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of 
Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 889–91 (2005). Ten federal circuit 
courts of appeals forty-two states, and the District of Columbia accept only expert witness 
testimony on eyewitness reliability at the discretion of the trial court. See United States v. 
Rodríguez–Berríos, 573 F.3d 55, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 
901, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140–44 (3d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Rodriguez–Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 
306, 310–18 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288–89 (2d Cir. 
1999); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923–27 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Harris, 
995 F.2d 532, 534–36 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312–13 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Ex parte Williams, 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1992); Skamarocius v. State, 
731 P.2d 63, 65–66 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Nordstrom, 25 P.3d 717, 730 (Ariz. 
S
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of the value of the research have a default rule that the science is not 
admissible.4 
At a general level, this Article is a discussion and analysis of why 
judges, when given the opportunity, do not do a better job of 
conforming their assumptions about human behavior to available social 
science. Rather than the impact of psychological research regarding 
limitations of eyewitness testimony on criminal procedure, this Article 
engages with the gap between psychological research on the 
pervasiveness of non-purposeful discrimination and legal doctrine that 
 
2001) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ferrero, 274 P.3d 509 (Ariz. 2012) 
(en banc); Parker v. State, 968 S.W.2d 592, 596–97 (Ark. 1998); People v. McDonald, 690 
P.2d 709, 719–21 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 
265 (Cal. 2000); Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Colo. 1991) (en banc), abrogated by 
People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 726–
31 (Conn. 2012); Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 338–39 (Del. 2003), superseded by statute 
on other grounds, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (2003); Benn v. United States, 978 
A.2d 1257, 1269–70 (D.C. 2009); McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 373 (Fla. 1998); 
Howard v. State, 686 S.E.2d 764, 770–71 (Ga. 2009); State v. Wright, 206 P.3d 856, 860–
65 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 569–71 (Ind. 2000); State v. 
Schutz, 579 N.W.2d 317, 319–20 (Iowa 1998); State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544, 689–90 (Kan. 
2014), rev’d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.W.3d 
485, 488–92 (Ky. 2002); State v. Kelly, 752 A.2d 188, 191–92 (Me. 2000); Bomas v. State, 
987 A.2d 98, 106–14 (Md. 2010); People v. Carson, 553 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996); State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d 368, 371–72 (Minn. 1998); Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 
3d 278, 293–98 (Miss. 2014); State v. Ware, 326 S.W.3d 512, 526–29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); 
State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 254–55 (Mont. 2003); State v. Trevino, 432 N.W.2d 503, 
517–18 (Neb. 1988); White v. State, 926 P.2d 291, 292 (Nev. 1996); People v. LeGrand, 
867 N.E.2d 374, 377–80 (N.Y. 2007); State v. Lee, 572 S.E.2d 170, 175–76 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002); State v. Fontaine, 382 N.W.2d 374, 377–78 (N.D. 1986); State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 
795, 801–04 (Ohio 1986); Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3, 20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998); 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 790–93 (Pa. 2014); State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 
1093, 1101–03 (R.I. 2004); State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d 369, 371–72 (S.C. 1991); State v. 
McCord, 505 N.W.2d 388, 391–95 (S.D. 1993); State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 300–
04 (Tenn. 2007); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State 
v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1112–17 (Utah 2009); State v. Percy, 595 A.2d 248, 252–53 (Vt. 
1990); Currie v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 335, 338–39 (Va. Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830, 840–43 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); State v. Taylor, 490 S.E.2d 748, 
753 (W. Va. 1997); State v. Shomberg, 709 N.W.2d 370, 375–77 (Wis. 2006); Engberg v. 
Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 79–80 (Wyo. 1991). 
4 Two jurisdictions retain the per se exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness 
reliability: the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and Louisiana. United States 
v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1997) (refusing to overturn per se exclusion rule 
because trial court did not abuse discretion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)); State v. Young, 35 So. 3d 1042, 1050 (La. 2010) (“By merely 
being labeled as a specialist in eyewitness identifications, an expert has the broad ability to 
mislead a jury through the ‘education’ process into believing a certain factor in an 
eyewitness identification makes that identification less reliable than it truly is.”). 
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requires that a plaintiff show purposeful intent.5 The converging results 
of a substantial body of research in social psychology and related 
disciplines suggests that people often discriminate against others based 
on race, gender, and other ostensibly legally protected characteristics, 
even when it is not their purpose to do so. Such “implicit bias,” as it is 
conventionally known, is thought to be largely a byproduct of the ways 
in which we automatically categorize information, including other 
people and ourselves.6 As a result, people tend to see, interpret, 
understand, and respond to events differently depending upon the 
demographic characteristics of those involved even when it is contrary 
to their values to do so: “Yet an uncomfortable starting point is to 
understand that racial stereotyping remains ubiquitous, and that the 
challenge is not a small number of twisted white supremacists but 
something infinitely more subtle and complex: People who believe in 
equality but who act in ways that perpetuate bias and inequality.”7 
Thus, based upon our best scientific understanding, judges should fully 
expect to see cases in which people are injured by discrimination that 
 
5 The disparate impact action recognized by courts under statutes such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601–31, allow for limited forms of liability and remedies for decisions that are 
unjustifiably discriminatory, irrespective of the cause of the discrimination. Thus, they can 
encompass decisions affected by implicit or “unconscious” bias or “subconscious 
stereotypes and prejudices.” Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522–23 (2015); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988). The distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact, 
however, is a legal one built around procedural and policy considerations from that domain, 
not a psychological one that necessarily tracks the contours of the phenomenon of 
discrimination. Accordingly, this Article discusses both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact cases where they provide good illustrations of the judicial considerations relevant to 
the law-science gap and remedies perspective. Even so, as a practical matter, the primary 
focus of this Article is on identification of the gap and application of that perspective to 
situations in which defendants continue to have no legal obligation to address one of the 
primary sources of discrimination in fact: those presently classified as disparate treatment 
cases. 
6 For a discussion of some of the psychological and social science research evidencing 
implicit bias in the law, see Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit 
Bias to Advance Anti-Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1 (2015); Anthony 
G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 945 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 969 (2006); and Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1124 (2012). 
7 Nicholas Kristof, Is Everyone a Little Bit Racist?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/opinion/nicholas-kristof-is-everyone-a-little-bit            
-racist.html. 
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occurred without any malicious or purposeful intent on the part of the 
defendant.8 
Judges construing a range of antidiscrimination laws, including the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provisions 
in civil rights statutes such as Title VII, however, continually hold that 
plaintiffs must prove that defendants acted with purposeful intent.9 The 
result is numerous cases in which plaintiffs are alleging disparate 
treatment, and in which there is substantial evidence that they have 
been treated detrimentally because of their race, gender, or status as a 
member of another protected category.10 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs 
are found to have no right to recover because the defendants were found 
to have acted “in spite of,” not “because of,” the discriminatory 
outcome of their behavior.11 
Where such law-science gaps exist, behavioral realists argue that 
legal scholars, judges, and others concerned about the accuracy, 
consistency, and validity of legal doctrine ought to address them 
overtly by bringing the behavioral assumptions supporting the doctrine, 
and doctrine itself, into conformity with the available science.12 
Alternatively, the judges should explain why the doctrine ought not to 
be changed based upon that information.13 However, identifying what 
judges ought to do is different from describing what they actually do or 
finding ways to get them to do it. Viewed as a prescriptive 
jurisprudential project, behavioral realism presents a compelling and 
influential approach to legal analysis and critique. Its descriptive utility 
in proscribing the use of education and awareness of social science to 
actually achieve doctrinal change, however, has been limited. A 
Westlaw search for opinions in discrimination cases referencing 
“implicit bias” reveals more examples of cases in which a majority of 
judges indicated that they are aware of the concept but refuse to alter 
antidiscrimination doctrine accordingly than cases in which a majority 
of judges acknowledge evidence of implicit bias as justification for 
liability.14 
 
8 See generally Erik J. Girvan & Grace Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological 
Case for Abandoning the “Discriminatory Motive” Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
1057 passim (2013) (collecting examples of language used by judges to describe what they 
mean by “discriminatory intent”). 
9 See supra Part I.A. 
10 See supra Part I.A. 
11 E.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
12 See, e.g., Girvan, supra note 6, at 79; Kang et al., supra note 6, at 1186. 
13 See, e.g., Girvan, supra note 6, at 71–73; Kang et al., supra note 6, at 1186. 
14 See infra Appendixes A–C. 
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Prior research articles have argued that the failure of social science 
to influence legal doctrine in the way that behavioral realism proscribes 
is due, in part, to a misplaced assumption that law-science gaps persist 
primarily because judges are unaware of the relevant science.15 The 
substantial efforts of scholars and advocates to educate judges and 
others about implicit bias have been fairly successful in convincing the 
judges to try to change their own behaviors to reduce the effects of 
implicit bias. Even so, the judges who have directly discussed implicit 
bias have generally found that there is no liability for injury from it.16 
That work outlines several reasons why teaching judges about the 
social science of implicit bias, or introducing evidence for it, is unlikely 
to close the antidiscrimination law-science gap: Problems with using 
generalized social science to infer facts in particular cases, limits on the 
judicial role and expertise in policymaking, concerns of judicial 
economy, judicial ideology, and problems related to remedies.17 For 
those who view implicit bias as a serious contemporary threat to equity 
and seek to use antidiscrimination law as a way to help reduce it, or at 
least compensate people who are likely to have been injured by it, 
developing an accurate understanding of why the law does not match 
the social science is a critical first step. Without it, efforts to close this, 
or any other, law-science gap will be considerably more difficult if not 
impossible. 
This Article builds on the earlier work by further exploring one of 
the potential reasons for the law-science gap—a perceived or actual 
lack of acceptable remedies for non-purposeful discrimination—in 
more detail. Specifically, Part I describes the gap between the legal and 
psychological understanding of discrimination.18 Part II presents two 
major alternative explanations for why the gap exists and persists: (1) 
an absence of scientific knowledge (i.e., that it is attributable, in large 
part, to a failure of judges to update the relevant legal doctrine to match 
 
15 See generally Girvan, supra note 6. 
16 See, e.g., Pippen v. State, 854 N.W.2d 1, 32 (Iowa 2014); State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 
89, 110 (Minn. 2009); State v. Saintcalle, 306 P.3d 326, 341 (Wash. 2013). 
17 Girvan, supra note 6, at 68–78. 
18 For the convenience of the reader, this section directly recounts, summarizes, and 
augments the discussion of topics covered in more detail in some of the author’s other 
contemporaneous research. See generally Girvan, supra note 6; Erik J. Girvan & Heather 
Marek, Psychological and Structural Bias in Civil Jury Awards, 8 J. AGGRESSION 
CONFLICT & PEACE RES. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139 
/ssrn.2659875); Erik J. Girvan, Wise Restraints?: Learning Legal Rules, Not Standards, 
Reduces the Effects of Stereotypes in Legal Decision-Making, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & 
L. 31 (2016). 
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advances in the psychological science of implicit bias) and (2) an 
absence of acceptable or workable remedies for implicit bias. In 
addition, this Article compares the ability of these alternatives to 
explain the evolution of antidiscrimination doctrine in two different 
areas of law: the death penalty and discretionary employment 
decisions. For each, this Article explains why the way in which doctrine 
has changed is consistent with the remedies perspective but not the 
lack-of-knowledge explanation. Part III, building on this case, 
describes several implications that the remedies perspective can have 
for the ways in which litigants, psychologists, and other advocates for 
closing the law-science gap in antidiscrimination proceed, as well as 
some of the weaknesses of these approaches. 
I 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW TARGETS PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION 
EVEN THOUGH MOST DISCRIMINATION IS LIKELY NOT PURPOSEFUL 
A. The Legal Standard 
The phrasing and intent of most antidiscrimination laws are 
consistent with the creation of liability for discrimination based on a 
person’s race, sex, or status as a member of another protected category, 
irrespective of the intent of the person who discriminates.19 Judges 
nevertheless have found that plaintiffs who bring antidiscrimination 
claims under the U.S. Constitution or for disparate treatment under 
Civil Rights statutes must prove that the defendant acted with a purpose 
to discriminate.20 For example, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
 
19 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1168 (1995). 
20 This point has been discussed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Developments in the 
Law—Race and the Criminal Process, Part VIII. Race and Capital Sentencing, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1603, 1614 (1988); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital 
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1404 (1988) (“In the race 
relations context, the most significant obstacle to federal judicial interference with 
sentencing decisions is the Supreme Court’s doctrine of purposeful discrimination.”); 
Girvan & Deason, supra note 8, at 1063; Girvan, supra note 6, at 10; Michael J. Perry, The 
Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541 
(1977) (“The Court rejected a nonmotivational theory of racial discrimination . . . , holding 
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits only government 
action undertaken with a ‘discriminatory purpose.’” (footnote omitted)); Note, Making the 
Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 
328 (1982) (“The 1976 decision of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis imposed a 
new burden upon equal protection plaintiffs: proof of invidious intent or purpose.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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Fourteenth Amendment is broadly worded to create a right to equal 
treatment by the government and its officials: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.21 
The primary goal of this provision was to help secure the civil rights of 
freed slaves.22 Neither the text of the Amendment itself nor its primary 
goal conditions the duty of governmental officials to provide equal 
protection on their hostile intent or purpose to discriminate. In 
Washington v. Davis, however, the Supreme Court held that the Clause 
prohibits only those actions taken with a discriminatory purpose (i.e., 
in order to produce a racially disparate outcome), not those that merely 
have a discriminatory impact.23 Following Davis, the Court reinforced 
and applied the purposeful intent requirement in a variety of Equal 
Protection Clause cases involving evidence of a substantial disparate 
impact. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp.,24 for example, the Court found that denial of a 
zoning variance for a racially integrated housing project in an all-White 
Chicago suburb was constitutional25 because the plaintiffs could not 
show that racial discrimination was “a motivating factor in the 
decision.”26 Similarly, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, the Court confirmed that knowing that a governmental action 
would produce a discriminatory outcome did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause so long as it was done “in spite of” rather than 
“because of” that result.27 
 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). With respect to the federal 
government, the Supreme Court has found that, in practice, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment incorporates the protections of the Equal Protection Clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954), 
supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
22 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1879) (citing Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872)), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
23 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see also Perry, supra note 20, at 543. 
24 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
25 Id. at 255–60 (of the suburb’s 64,000 residents, approximately 27, or 0.04%, were 
Black). 
26 Id. at 265–66. For a more robust discussion of psychology and the law of a 
“discriminatory motive,” see generally Girvan & Deason, supra note 8. 
27 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Absent any 
adequately supported factual allegations as to discriminatory intent behind the enactment of 
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Equally well documented are the intent-based restrictions on the 
disparate treatment cause of action under antidiscrimination statutes,28 
such as Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunities subchapter of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 As with the Equal Protection Clause, 
by its terms, section 2000e-2 of Title VII is broadly worded to prohibit 
employers from treating an employee differently “because of” the 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; . . .30 
The phrase “because of” arguably encompasses all manner of 
causality irrespective of the employer’s intent, including negligent, 
reckless, knowing, and purposeful actions.31 Justice Alito’s recent 
dissent in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.32 illustrates this point nicely. 
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
Justice Alito argued that the plain meaning of the phrase “because of” 
in a similar provision of the Fair Housing Act should be interpreted as 
a restriction on claims under the Act to only those in which there is a 
 
the 1894 constitutional provision, we are compelled to find that the New York Constitution’s 
requirement that the legislature pass felon disenfranchisement laws is based on the obvious, 
noninvidious purpose of disenfranchising felons, not Blacks or Latinos.”); United States v. 
Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 671–72 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1779 (2014); 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009). 
28 Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to 
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 
MO. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2008). 
29 The antidiscrimination statutes include the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101–12,213 (2012), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–266 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17), Amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631. For convenience and brevity, this Article 
uses Title VII as an example. The thrust of the argument, however, applies beyond the 
particularities of this statute and regulatory framework. 
30  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
31 Girvan & Deason, supra note 8, at 1061–63. 
32 Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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finding of intentional discrimination.33 To illustrate the common usage 
and support his argument, he collected fourteen Washington Post 
articles published on January 21, 2015, the day the case was argued, 
each of which use the phrase “because of.”34 Undermining the 
argument, however, several of the examples use “because of” for 
factual causality, including physical or structural processes or 
constraints, the operation and impact of which occur without intent of 
any kind: 
• “Berman, Jury Selection Starts in Colo. Shooting Trial, p. A2 
(‘Jury selection is expected to last four to five months because of a 
massive pool of potential jurors’);”35 
• “Hicks, Post Office Proposes Hikes in Postage Rates, p. A19 (‘The 
Postal Service lost $5.5 billion in 2014, in large part because of 
continuing declines in first-class mail volume’);”36 
• “Letter to the Editor, Metro’s Safety Flaws, p. A20 (‘[A] circuit 
breaker automatically opened because of electrical arcing’).”37 
Consistent with Justice Alito’s examples of the plain meaning of the 
phrase “because of,” judges have an ample basis upon which to 
construe this language as a prohibition on adverse actions that were 
factually caused by race, irrespective of the employer’s intent. Indeed, 
because it does not require evidence of intentional discrimination, the 
disparate impact theory is often characterized as serving this exact 
role.38 Courts, however, have been reluctant to embrace disparate 
impact theory in situations in which the challenged practice is the 
delegation of decision making to managerial or other employee 
discretion, limiting it instead to specific top-down decision rules that 
themselves result in a discriminatory impact.39 As discussed in Part I.B, 
 
33 Id. at 2535. 
34 Id. at 2534. 
35 Id. at 2534 n.2 (emphasis added). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See supra note 5. See generally, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under 
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987) (examining 
the foundation, development, and plaintiff’s burden of proving disparate treatment). 
39 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After 
Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1325–26 (1998); Krieger, supra note 19, at 
1219; Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VII’s 
Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 869 passim (1985); discussion of the Dukes 
v. Wal-mart cases, infra Part II.C.2. 
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discretionary decisions are exactly those which implicit bias is most 
likely to impact. 
Returning to the disparate treatment cause of action, even if the 
phrase “because of” is ambiguous, the Congressional goal for this 
section of Title VII supports a reading in which adverse employment 
actions that were factually caused by the plaintiffs’ race are 
prohibited.40 Plain meaning and congressional intent aside, the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green interpreted Title 
VII narrowly to require evidence of a purpose to discriminate.41 As in 
Arlington Heights,42 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court 
recognized the possibility that more than one factor can motivate an 
employment decision.43 Offering a similar response, it held that Title 
VII creates a right to be free from discriminatory decisions that harm 
employees and that are “based on a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate considerations.”44 Even then, however, plaintiffs must 
show that at least part of the defendant’s “true reason” or “unlawful 
motive,” that is, the defendant’s purposeful intent, was to discriminate 
against the plaintiff based on his or her status as a member of a 
protected class:45 
 In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of 
the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful 
response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or 
employee was a woman.46 
Currently, “[t]he ultimate question in every employment discrimination 
case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff 
was the victim of intentional discrimination.”47 
 
40 Girvan & Deason, supra note 8, at 1060–61. 
41 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973); see also Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). 
42 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). 
43 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989). Later, in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Congress amended Title VII (but not other, related antidiscrimination statutes) to 
indicate that prohibited discrimination under Title VII can be a function of one of the 
employer’s motives rather than just a product of the sole discriminatory motive: “Except as 
otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when 
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added). 
44 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241. 
45 Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). 
46 Id. at 250. 
47 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). 
GIRVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2016  12:38 PM 
2016] When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial Realism 371 
in Antidiscrimination Law 
B. The Psychological Science 
Psychologists who study bias, discrimination, and prejudice 
generally understand that there are two distinct types of bias—explicit 
and implicit—each associated with one of two different types of 
cognitive processing.48 The first type of processing, generally known 
as System 1, is efficient, operates extremely quickly, and is automatic, 
working mostly outside of our conscious awareness.49 It monitors, 
decodes, evaluates, interprets, and otherwise tries to make some sense 
out of the nearly continuous input our brains receive from the 
environment without us having to pay attention to or make any 
conscious decisions about it.50 The second type of cognitive 
processing, System 2, is what we experience as conscious attention.51 
It is relatively slow and effortful, allowing us to make controlled and 
deliberate decisions.52 
Explicit bias operates as part of System 2. It is what we typically 
think of as prejudice: ethnocentrism, racism, and other consciously 
endorsed attitudes towards or beliefs about people based upon their 
membership in a socially-defined group.53 Regular repetition of 
surveys on nationally representative samples of U.S. adults show that, 
at least as assessed in self-reported measures,54 explicit bias has 
declined substantially since the mid-1900s.55 Even so, significant racial 
disparities persisted over the period in a variety of domains, including 
 
48 Jonathan St. B.T. Evans & Keith E. Stanovich, Dual-Process Theories of Higher 
Cognition: Advancing the Debate, 8 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 223, 225 (2013); Eliot R. 
Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: 
Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 108, 108 (2000). 
49 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451–52 (2003); see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20 (2011). 
50 Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality, supra note 49, at 1451. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Adam R. Pearson et al., The Nature of Contemporary Prejudices: Insights from 
Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 314, 323–26 (2009). 
54 Girvan, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
55 Lawrence D. Bobo et al., The Real Record on Racial Attitudes, in SOCIAL TRENDS IN 
AMERICAN LIFE: FINDINGS FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY SINCE 1972 38, 47 fig.3.1 
(Peter V. Mardsen ed., 2012); ANDREW M. GREELEY & PAUL B. SHEATSLEY, NAT’L 
OPINION RES. CTR., U. CHI., ATTITUDES TOWARDS DESEGREGATION 18 tbl.8 (1971), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED068600.pdf. 
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employment,56 education,57 home ownership,58 the accumulation of 
wealth,59 placement in foster care,60 school discipline,61 and 
incarceration.62 
One explanation for the continuing disparities is that they are 
reinforced and maintained by decisions that are implicitly biased.63 
 
56 Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 
74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 passim (2009); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 
AM. J. SOC. 937, 960 (2003); see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are 
Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor 
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 passim (2004). 
57 See Grace Kao & Jennifer S. Thompson, Racial and Ethnic Stratification in 
Educational Achievement and Attainment, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 417 passim (2003); Jaekyung 
Lee, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap Trends: Reversing the Progress Toward Equity?, 
31 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 passim (2002). 
58 See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home Ownership and the 
Black-White Wealth Gap, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 281 passim (2002). 
59 See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA passim (1999); THOMAS SHAPIRO ET AL., INST. ON ASSETS & 
SOC. POL’Y, THE ROOTS OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP: EXPLAINING THE 
BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE passim (2013), http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Author 
/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf; Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership 
and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2006). 
60 See ALICIA SUMMERS ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT 
JUDGES, DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER CARE: 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN passim (2013), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default 
/files/Disproportionality%20Rates%20for%20Children%20of%20Color%20in%20Foster
%20Care%202013.pdf; E. Michael Foster et al., Explaining the Disparity in Placement 
Instability Among African-American and White Children in Child Welfare: A Blinder–
Oaxaca Decomposition, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 118 passim (2011); Fred 
Wulczyn et al., Poverty, Social Disadvantage, and the Black/White Placement Gap, 35 
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 65 passim (2013). 
61 DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE 
SCHOOLS IN CRISIS 2–3 (2010), http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads 
/publication/Suspended_Education.pdf; Kent McIntosh et al., Education Not Incarceration: 
A Conceptual Model for Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in School 
Discipline, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD.: INFORMING POL’Y FOR CHILD. RISK 1, 2 fig.1 
(2014) (relying on data for years 1988–89, 2006–07, and 2011–12 from Civil Rights Data 
Collection, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices 
/list/ocr/data.html?src=rt/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014); and data for years 1972–73 from 
CHILD. DEF. FUND, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 82 (1975), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED113797.pdf). 
62 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS passim (2010); Christopher J. Lyons & Becky Pettit, 
Compounded Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and Wage Growth, 58 SOC. PROBS. 257 
passim (2011). 
63 There are numerous structural explanations for these disparities, which are vitally 
important to understanding the problem of contemporary racial discrimination and for 
crafting a solution. See, e.g., Barbara Reskin, The Race Discrimination System, 38 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 17 passim (2012).  Similarly, there are other psychological alternatives to implicit 
bias for persistent discrimination. See Girvan, supra note 6, at 31. To the extent any of these 
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Implicit bias is associated with System 1’s efficient, automatic, 
cognitive processing.64 Rather than conscious endorsement of beliefs 
or feelings, it has its roots in generalized associations formed from 
systematically repetitious or unique and limited experience or 
exposure.65 Thus, regularly seeing images of Black but not White 
criminal offenders on the news may lead even people who value 
equality to treat a Black individual as if he had a criminal background 
(or someone White as if he does not).66 For example, Black civil rights 
champion Reverend Jesse Jackson once stated, “There is nothing more 
painful to me at this stage in my life than to walk down the street and 
hear footsteps and start thinking about robbery—then look around and 
see somebody white and feel relieved.”67 Moreover, while explicit 
racial biases have declined, there is evidence that implicit racial biases 
pervade modern society. For example, in a sample of over 700,000 
primarily American participants of all races and ethnicities collected 
from 2000 to 2006, the responses of over two-thirds, 68%, indicated an 
implicit attitude favoring Whites over Blacks while approximately one-
sixth, 14%, had the opposite response pattern.68 
 
can be seen as non-purposeful but factual causes of discrimination, the arguments here may 
generalize to them. Even so, a further description and discussion of structural or other 
sources of bias is beyond the scope of this Article. 
64 See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1989); Anthony G. Greenwald & 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 
PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 19 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald, Sensory Feedback Mechanisms in 
Performance Control: With Special Reference to the Ideo-Motor Mechanism, 77 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 73, 73 (1970); David L. Hamilton & Robert K. Gifford, Illusory Correlation in 
Interpersonal Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 392, 392 (1976); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp 
Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 
PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231 (1977); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 79, 83–86 (1969). Also, a great deal has been written recently about implicit bias for 
a legal audience. See sources cited supra note 6. Accordingly, I will focus only on the key 
features here. 
65 See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO 
CULTURE 328 (Michael Carmichael ed., 2d ed. 2007); Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 64, 
at 5–15. 
66 See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 64, at 5–15. 
67 Bob Herbert, Opinion, In America; A Sea Change On Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/12/opinion/in-america-a-sea-change-on-crime 
.html. 
68 Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 48–51 tbls.4, 5, 6 & 7 (2007). 
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Finally, there is evidence that implicit bias influences real-world 
behaviors. For example, in field studies, individuals’ levels of implicit 
bias have been found to predict: 
• The tendency for pediatricians to recommend pain medication at 
lower rates for Black children than White children with identical 
symptoms;69 
• Discrimination against Arab-Muslim70 and obese71 job applicants 
in hiring; 
• Teachers’ expectations for the performance of ethnic minority 
compared to non-minority children in their classes as well as the 
actual gap between the non-minority and minority ethnic students 
on standardized tests;72 
• The extent to which labor arbitrators decide disputes in favor of 
women;73 and 
• How much force police officers use when arresting Black children 
compared to White children.74 
The fact that there is evidence from each of these studies that people 
are treated differently than others because of their race, gender, or other 
characteristic does not mean that the pediatricians, human resource 
professionals, teachers, arbitrators, or police officers were racist or 
sexist in the classical understanding of the term. Nor does it mean that 
it was the purpose of these professionals to discriminate against them. 
Rather, unlike explicit bias, implicit bias can impact perception, 
judgment, and decision-making without our conscious knowledge or 
intent.75 This phenomenon is particularly true “when a perceiver lacks 
 
69 Janice A. Sabin & Anthony G. Greenwald, The Influence of Implicit Bias on Treatment 
Recommendations for 4 Common Pediatric Conditions: Pain, Urinary Tract Infection, 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and Asthma, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 988, 992–
93 fig.1 (2012). 
70 Dan-Olof Rooth, Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring—Real World 
Evidence, 17 LAB. ECON. 523, 524, 529 (2010). 
71 Jens Agerström & Dan-Olof Rooth, The Role of Automatic Obesity Stereotypes in Real 
Hiring Discrimination, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 790, 801 (2011). 
72 Linda van den Bergh et al., The Implicit Prejudiced Attitudes of Teachers: Relations 
to Teacher Expectations and the Ethnic Achievement Gap, 47 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 497, 518 
(2010). 
73 Erik J. Girvan et al., The Generalizability of Gender Bias: Testing the Effects of 
Contextual, Explicit, and Implicit Sexism on Labor Arbitration Decisions, 39 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 525 passim (2015). 
74 Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 539–40 (2014). 
75 See David M. Amodio, The Social Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations, 19 EUR. 
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (2008); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using 
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the motivation, time, or cognitive capacity to think deeply (and 
accurately) about others.”76 Thus, individuals’ implicit biases are more 
likely to affect their decisions when those decisions must be made 
quickly or when they are physically or mentally fatigued.77 Similarly, 
implicit bias tends to influence decisions that are inherently ambiguous, 
difficult, or subjective (i.e., those in which people have to exercise their 
discretion, make a judgment call, or just go with their gut).78 
Consistent with this, a substantial body of social psychological 
research suggests that people are most prone to bias when they must 
draw their own inferences.79 In a classic demonstration, Dovidio and 
Gaertner found that, when asked to recommend hiring a job applicant 
who was represented as either Black or White, participants showed no 
evidence of racial bias when the information they were given about the 
candidate suggested that he was either highly or poorly qualified.80 But 
when the participants were given ambiguous information showing that 
the candidate was moderately qualified, participants recommended 
hiring the White candidate significantly more often that the Black one 
(76% of the time compared to 45% of the time, respectively).81 
Legal scholars also have connected ambiguity, subjectivity, and 
discretion with biased decision-making when discussing the distinction 
between two forms of legal doctrine: Rules and standards.82 Rules are 
 
the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2009). 
76 C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically 
About Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93, 105 (2000); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra 
note 65. 
77 Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Stereotypes and Prejudice in the Blood: Sucrose Drinks 
Reduce Prejudice and Stereotyping, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 288, 288 (2009) 
(“[P]eople who have lower levels of blood glucose may be more likely to express prejudice 
and use stereotypes . . . .”). 
78 See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 318 (2000) (discussing a study showing bias against 
Blacks in hiring decisions where the candidate’s qualifications were ambiguous). 
79 Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 257 (2002); Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, 
Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype 
Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. REV. 56, 56 (2005); see also William T. Hoyt & Michael-David 
Kerns, Magnitude and Moderators of Bias in Observer Ratings: A Meta-analysis, 4 
PSYCHOL. METHODS 403, 403 (1999). 
80 Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 78, at 318. 
81 Id. at 317. 
82 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
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inflexible and determinative in the sense that they “attempt to specify 
outcomes before particular cases arise,” leaving little or no room for 
discretion or interpretation.83 Standards, by comparison, are flexible 
and indeterminate in that, in order to make a decision, the person 
applying the doctrine must figure out what it means in the context of 
the facts of a particular situation.84 A speed limit of fifty-five miles per 
hour and formulaic sentencing guidelines are examples of rules. 
Statutes specifying that drivers must proceed at a speed that is 
reasonable and cautious for existing conditions and discretionary 
departures from sentencing guidelines are examples of standards. 
When a rule governs a given situation, application is straightforward 
and the correct outcome is generally constrained and highly 
predictable. As a result, rules are thought to reduce or eliminate errors 
in judgment, including those caused by biases:85 
 [Rules] can also counteract something worse: bias, favoritism, or 
discrimination in the minds of people who decide particular cases. In 
this way, rules are associated with impartiality, a notion which is 
captured in the idea that Justice, the goddess, is “blindfolded.” Rules 
are blind to many features of a case that might otherwise be relevant, 
and that are relevant in some social contexts, or to many things on 
whose relevance people have great difficulty in agreeing—religion, 
social class, good or bad looks, height, and so forth.86 
A rule’s ability to restrain individual-level bias, however, is thought 
to come at the cost of imprecision in outcome. With standards, 
decision-makers can tailor the outcome to idiosyncratic features of a 
situation. However, the discretion necessary to do so is what leaves 
room for bias-prone interpretations.87 
Returning to the speed-limit example, in its report on the Ferguson 
Police Department (FPD), U.S. Department of Justice indicated that it 
found that Black drivers accounted for 80% of citations for speeding 
when officers relied upon their own visual assessments but only 72% 
 
REV. 1685, 1701 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961 
(1995). 
83 Sunstein, supra note 82, at 961. 
84 Id. at 965. 
85 Kennedy, supra note 82, at 1706; Sunstein, supra note 82, at 974. 
86 Sunstein, supra note 82, at 974. For an in-depth examination of justice iconography 
and the evolution of adjudication, see JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING 
JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC 
COURTROOMS (2011). 
87 Kennedy, supra note 82, at 1706; Sunstein, supra note 82, at 974. 
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of speeding citations when a laser or radar gun was used.88 Black 
people make up 67% of the population of Ferguson, Missouri.89 
Assuming that they make up the same proportion of drivers, the odds 
of a Black versus non-Black driver getting a speeding ticket is 1.11 
times larger when police officers must use their judgment and draw 
their own inferences about who is speeding as compared to when they 
rely upon an objective measure of the car’s speed. The statistically 
significant discrepancy is modest in magnitude, but was nevertheless 
viewed by the Department of Justice as practically significant in light 
of the high number of incidents involved and the potential real-life 
repercussions of a citation for speeding.90 
Taken together, the convergent results of lab and field research on 
bias, as well as the psychological and jurisprudential theory regarding 
when it is most likely to occur, provide strong support for the role of 
discretion, not intent, in causing harm from discrimination. Legal 
doctrine, however, does not reflect this insight. Part II of this Article 
examines two possible explanations for the initiation and continuation 
of this gap—lack of knowledge and remedies considerations—and 
argues that the latter of the two is most significant. 
II 
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW-SCIENCE GAP IN 
ORDER TO CLOSE IT 
Behavioral realism is a prescriptive approach to legal analysis based 
upon the observation that judges regularly make assumptions about 
human behavior when creating and modifying legal doctrine.91 When 
they do so and the assumptions are the subject of social scientific 
research, then judges ought to have the affirmative responsibility to 
either look to the relevant scientific evidence and conform the doctrine 
to it or explicitly justify why the law should differ from the science. In 
 
88 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 66 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press              
-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
89 Id. at 67. 
90 Id. (“These disparities mean that African Americans in Ferguson bear the 
overwhelming burden of FPD’s pattern of unlawful stops, searches, and arrests with respect 
to these highly discretionary ordinances.”). 
91 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001 
(2006). 
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the words of Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske in their article describing 
the approach and its application to antidiscrimination law: 
Behavioral realism, like naturalism, stands for the proposition that 
judges should not generate the behavioral theories sometimes used in 
the construction or justification of legal doctrine through a solely 
conceptual, a priori process. To the extent that legal doctrines rely 
on stated or unstated theories about the nature of real world 
phenomena, behavioral realism argues, those theories should remain 
consistent with advances in relevant fields of empirical inquiry. And 
where the real world phenomena relevant to a particular area of law 
concern human social perception, motivation, and judgment, the 
relevant domains of empirical inquiry with which legal theories 
should remain consistent include cognitive social psychology and the 
related social sciences.92 
If, consistent with the insights underlying the scientific method and 
naturalistic philosophy, it is possible to know how the world works, 
then having and acting on that knowledge will produce more 
predictable results than proceeding in ignorance of it.93 To the extent 
legal doctrine targeting discrimination incorporates accurate models 
“of what discrimination is, what causes it to occur, how it can be 
prevented, and how its presence or absence can best be discerned in 
particular cases,” the doctrine is more likely to be able to achieve its 
intended purpose.94 The failure to incorporate social scientific 
understanding into law is particularly problematic in a legal system that 
values just and reasonable, or at least not arbitrary, inconsistent, or 
hypocritical, results.95 As such, failures to reconcile the two must be 
exposed, changed, and justified or admonished as covert departures 
from stated public policy. 
Asserting that the law-science gap in antidiscrimination doctrine 
ought to be closed as a jurisprudential matter is different than 
 
92 Id. See generally Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence, in 
ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 79 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (describing 
naturalism); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001) (identifying recent developments in epistemology 
and its application to the rules of evidence); Mitu Gulati & Laura Beth Nielsen, 
Introduction: A New Legal Realist Perspective on Employment Discrimination, 31 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 797 (2006) (focusing legal realism on employment discrimination suits); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008) 
(describing legal realism). 
93 Girvan & Deason, supra note 8, at 1065–67. 
94 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 91, at 1001. 
95 Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2006). 
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identifying how it might actually be closed in practice.96 The former is 
policy. The latter is pragmatic, requiring an accurate understanding of 
what caused the gap to form and why it persists. There are numerous 
possible explanations to consider, each of which likely operates to 
some extent.97 Part II compares two of these explanations: (1) that it 
reflects judges’ lack of knowledge of the relevant psychological 
science and associated evidence of injury, and (2) that it reflects a 
judicial concern about what could, as a practical matter, be done to 
remedy implicit bias and other unintentional forms of discrimination.98 
The Article then shows that remedies concerns play a substantial role 
in the evolution of antidiscrimination doctrine in two areas involving 
discretion: the death penalty and employment decisions. 
A. Judicial Ignorance of Psychological Science 
The existence and persistence of the law-science gap in 
antidiscrimination doctrine is often attributed to a lack of judicial 
knowledge of the psychological science of implicit bias.99 For 
example, scholars have described judges who interpret 
antidiscrimination doctrine in ways that prohibit only purposeful 
 
96 Girvan, supra note 6, at 79; Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through 
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 503 (2010) (observing 
that “[o]f course, everything we have written may be politically naive,” and discussing three 
categories of “cultural, social, and political forces” objections to the acceptance of the 
science of implicit bias); see also Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 
54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139, 1146 (2010) (considering that, although science and evidence-
based counts of discrimination theoretically have extra persuasive power and are somewhat 
privileged in policymaking, they still can be denied by those with ideological motivations 
to do so). 
97 Girvan, supra note 6, at 70–71. For example, there are problems with using generalized 
social science to infer facts in particular cases, limits on the judicial role and expertise in 
policymaking, concerns of judicial economy, judicial ideology, and problems related to 
remedies. Id. 
98 Other sources cited in this Article discuss structural and sociological sources of 
discrimination. While the argument here focuses on the law-science gap related to research 
on implicit bias, the idea that remedies concerns are a substantial barrier to advancing 
antidiscrimination law applies equally to other, non-purposeful sources of injury from racial 
discrepancies. 
99 Other explanations are also recognized. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 91, at 998 
(attributing the gap to differences in the goals and sources of legitimacy of the legal system 
(conclusively resolve particular disputes, stability, and predictability) and sciences 
(continuously advance knowledge, rigorous testing, and evolution)); see also Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (“I defer to no one in my confidence 
in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific 
status of a theory depends on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.”); 
Girvan, supra note 6, at 37–38. 
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discrimination as “ignoring” or “blind to unconscious bias”100 and their 
failure to update the doctrine attributable to a mistaken belief that 
“discrimination is ‘easy to identify.’”101 Similarly, antidiscrimination 
doctrine itself is described as having been developed “in ignorance of 
[implicit social cognition] generally and implicit bias specifically”102 
and to “typically reflect common sense based on naive psychological 
theories.”103 It is thought that judicial use of “intuitive” or “lay” 
psychology, rather than empirically supported theory, is 
understandable in this context, as this is what we all regularly use our 
own anecdotal experience to do: 
[J]udges, like most people, take for granted certain assumptions 
about how people behave and what motivates them. These 
assumptions seem self-evidently correct, even when they are wrong. 
For this reason, judges sometimes incorporate empirically testable 
social science claims into their legal reasoning without even noticing 
that they are doing so.104 
For the reasons articulated by the behavioral realists, however, use of 
lay theories that are less accurate than, or even entirely inconsistent 
with, models of human behavior grounded in more recent social science 
is unjustified.105 If the antidiscrimination law-science gap is caused 
primarily by a lack of judicial knowledge, then the solution to it should 
be to inform judges of research supporting the psychological science of 
implicit bias and evidence of its applicability to the cases they are 
deciding. 
 
100 Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 173 (2005). 
101 Id. at 173 n.83 (“Any acceptance of unconscious bias, however, has not (yet) affected 
the Batson procedure’s focus on the striking attorney’s discriminatory intent. One reason for 
this may be that the Court still believes discrimination is ‘easy to identify.’”) (citing Sheri 
L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 67 (1993)). 
102 Kang & Banaji, supra note 95, at 1078. 
103 Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3. ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 427, 440 (2007). 
104 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 91, at 1002. 
105 See Kang & Banaji, supra note 95, at 1079 (“A model that supposes that 
discrimination takes place explicitly, through a rational cost-benefit analysis or other 
expression of explicitly held views has become woefully out-of-date.”). See generally 
BEYOND COMMON SENSE, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (Eugene 
Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2007) (collecting topics on which psychology yields non-
intuitive, legally relevant insights). 
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B. Absence of Acceptable Remedies 
An alternative explanation for the existence and persistence of the 
antidiscrimination law-science gap is a concern about remedies. The 
conventional, formal approach to legal thought, analysis, and decision-
making is rights-and-duties focused.106 In it, adjudication proceeds as 
an examination of whether the plaintiff has proven facts that satisfy the 
elements necessary to state a valid claim. If the plaintiff has done so, 
and the defendant has no valid defense, then the court will issue 
judgment for the plaintiff and order that the defendant provide the 
applicable remedy. Figure 1 illustrates this general approach for a claim 
of breach of contract and negligence actions. 
Figure 1:  
Breach of Contract Negligence Tort 
 
Under the conventional, rights-and-duties-centered approach, the 
remedy (i.e., what the court actually does for “a litigant who has been 
wronged or is about to be wronged”107), is treated as an almost 
procedural afterthought. Further, those remedies are generally viewed 
as something that follows naturally from an injury and substantive right 
to relief. In the words of Blackstone, it is “a general and indisputable 
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by 
suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”108 As the 
instrumental end of litigation, however, remedies, and limitations on 
which and whether they are available, can very effectively diminish the 
scope of a substantive right, or extinguish it altogether. 
A classic example of a court imposing a remedial limitation on a 
substantive right in contract law is the case of Peevyhouse v. Garland 
 
106 Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2014). 
107 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 
(4th ed. 2012). 
108 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23. 
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Coal and Mining Co.109 There, as recounted in the judicial opinion, a 
farm family leased a portion of its property to a mining company for 
use as a strip mine (i.e., one in which minerals are extracted by digging 
large pits on the surface rather than through subterranean mine 
shafts).110 As an expressly negotiated condition of the lease, the 
company agreed to restore the property after the mining was 
complete.111 When it later refused to do so, the plaintiffs sued for 
breach of contract claiming as damages the approximate costs of the 
agreed upon remediation: $25,000.112 In the case, the parties 
effectively stipulated to the fact that all of the elements necessary for 
an enforceable contract were present and that the company violated its 
substantive duty by breaching the lease.113 But the company claimed 
that the appropriate measure of the injury, and thus the amount the 
plaintiffs could recover, was the diminution in the market value of the 
property: $300.114 At trial, the jury awarded an amount between 
these115 and, on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the 
defendant.116 
Defining the remediation provision in the lease as “merely incidental 
to the main purpose in view,” it held that “where the economic benefit 
which would result to lessor by full performance of the work is grossly 
disproportionate to the cost of performance, the damages which lessor 
may recover are limited to the diminution in value resulting to the 
premises because of the non-performance.”117 
Thus, under the doctrine established by the court, there is a legally 
recognized right to recover for injury from the breach of a valid lease 
in these circumstances and the remediation provision is enforceable. 
However, that substantive right does not include the right to recover 
the actual injury in terms of specific performance or its equivalent cost, 
only the much lower value of economic harm measured in terms of the 
 
109 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962). 
110 Id. at 111. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 112. 
115 Id. at 111 (“[The jury] returned a verdict for plaintiffs for $5000.00-only a fraction of 
the ‘cost of performance’, [sic] but more than the total value of the farm even after the 
remedial work is done.”). 
116 Id. at 114. 
117 Id. at. 114. For an in-depth look at the case, see Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. 
Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 
1341 (1995). 
GIRVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2016  12:38 PM 
2016] When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial Realism 383 
in Antidiscrimination Law 
change in resale value of the property.118 The difference is akin to 
damnum absque injuria (i.e., harm for which there is no legal recovery) 
as there is no right, in any meaningful sense, to state a claim for relief 
for it.119 
Some limits that courts place on remedies after finding that the 
defendant violated the plaintiff’s substantive rights are necessary as a 
practical matter. The fictions of economics aside, it is impossible to 
place an accurate value on certain categories of injuries, such as a life 
itself,120 or otherwise fully restore plaintiffs to the condition they 
would have been in absent the defendants’ harmful acts: 
Because the wrongdoer’s substantive violation has changed the 
victim’s world for the worse, students of Remedies share . . . “a 
special awareness of the ironic incongruities between moral purpose 
and pragmatic result.” If Remedies is a science, it is a science of 
choice between responsible solutions in a world of limited 
possibilities.121 
Judges, thus, may work hard to do their best while recognizing that 
there is ultimately no salve for the particular injury a plaintiff suffered 
that will remove his or her scars. 
Other limitations imposed on remedies after liability is determined 
represent public policy tradeoffs designed to increase or attenuate the 
impact of certain substantive rights on defendants. A familiar 
legislative example is the 1991 Amendments to Title VII, which made 
limited compensatory and punitive damages available for plaintiffs in 
disparate treatment cases (i.e., those that require a showing of 
purposeful discrimination) but not plaintiffs in disparate impact cases 
(i.e., those in which showing the discriminatory impact of an 
employment practice can, in theory, substitute for evidence of 
intent).122 Judges, however, use remedies to satisfy similar public 
policy considerations in response to the cumulative efforts of plaintiffs’ 
 
118 See Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 114. 
119 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (1988) (quoting 5 
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW: TORTS § 6 (10th ed. 1988)); Joseph William 
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 
1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 984–85 (1982); see also 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES 
TREATISE § 1:1 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]here can be ‘damage without injury’ in those instances 
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations 
are often described with the Latin phrase ‘damnum absque injuria.’”). 
120 Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982). 
121 Doug Rendleman, Remedies-The Law School Course, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 535, 535 
(2001) (citation omitted). 
122 42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(g) (2012). 
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and defendants’ attorneys, who use the issue of remedies as an 
opportunity to take a second bite at the apple and protect their 
respective clients’ interests. Or, in the words of Judge Easterbrook: 
“Remedies are designed to track entitlements, to give people their due. 
When we hear an objection to the remedy, it is almost always a 
disguised objection to the definition of what is due, and not to the 
methods used to apply the balm.”123 
Peevyhouse, as it is commonly taught and understood, is arguably 
such a case.124 Although the plaintiffs won on the substantive legal 
issue of contract breach, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ 
substantive right did not entitle them to more than the difference in the 
market value of their property.125 Other classic examples include that 
consequential damages are not generally recoverable when defendants 
breach a duty defined by contract, such as delaying delivery of a mill 
shaft,126 but are recoverable when defendants breach a duty defined by 
tort law, such as negligently securing a ship to a pier.127 Each involves 
a court finding that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s substantive 
rights. They differ only in the nature and scope of remedy that the court 
finds is appropriate and available for the violation. 
The practical limitations on remedies for injuries that cannot be 
reliably measured or meaningfully redressed and lawyers’—or 
lobbyists’—use of remedies to advance their clients’ interests are 
consistent with the conventional approach to legal thought in which 
substantive rights are primary to and temporally proceed remedies 
analysis. Often, however, the order is reversed and the remedies are the 
tail that wags the substantive dog. In these instances, courts alter the 
scope of the substantive rights, or refuse to recognize or enforce them 
altogether, because the remedies that would accompany such a right are 
seen as impossible, impracticable, or otherwise undesirable or 
unacceptable as a matter of public policy.128 Figure 2 illustrates this 
remedies-centered approach in breach of contract and torts actions. 
 
123 Frank H. Easterbrook, Civil Rights and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 
103 (1991). 
124 Maute, supra note 117, at 1428. 
125 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962). 
126 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151. 
127 Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 722 (2d Cir. 1964). 
128 Coenen, supra note 106, at 1213–14; Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter 
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738 (1992); John C. Jeffries, 
Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89–90 (1999); Daryl 
J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857 
(1999). 
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Figure 2:  
Breach of Contract Negligence Tort 
 
 
The Hand formula129 for determining what constitutes reasonable 
care—and thus not negligence—is a theoretical example of a remedies-
centered prescriptive principle. The formula states that defendants’ 
duty of care exists only to the extent that the costs of the precautions 
necessary to avoid injuring plaintiffs (i.e., the burden on the defendants, 
B) are less than the expected value of the injuries that would likely 
result from the failure to take those precautions (i.e., the severity of the 
injury or loss to the plaintiffs, L, times the probability of the injuries, 
P): B < PL.130 Viewed through the remedies lens, the formula is an 
assertion that a court ought to deny plaintiffs a substantive right to relief 
when the cost of preventing the injury or undoing it (e.g., specific 
performance or another type of injunction) would be greater than the 
substitutionary sum (i.e., the remedy) that the defendants will likely 
pay potential plaintiffs in compensation for their injuries. It reverses 
the conventional approach because it suggests that public policy 
concerns related to how much defendants would have to pay if 
 
129 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“Since there 
are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she 
becomes a menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to 
provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she 
will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate 
precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if 
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether 
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.”). For one of numerous 
discussions of the formula, see Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 1015 (1994). 
130 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 85 (1987). 
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plaintiffs have a substantive right should narrow the scope of the 
substantive rights themselves. 
There are several areas of law in which remedies considerations 
overtly impact whether and the extent to which courts recognize 
substantive rights. Among the more overt of these is the issue of 
redressability as a threshold to federal jurisdiction.131 In terms of legal 
taxonomy, redressability is located within the doctrine of standing.132 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to “cases” and “controversies.”133 This provision was designed 
to limit the power of the judicial branch by prohibiting it from issuing 
advisory opinions (i.e., opinions that are not related to a particular 
dispute that has been brought to the court for resolution, as these would 
be, in effect, legislation). Relying upon this language, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that plaintiffs do not have access to the courts to 
vindicate their substantive rights unless they can show an injury that is 
“concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the 
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”134 
Focusing on the last element of this analysis, an injury is not 
redressable if there is not a “substantial likelihood” that the remedy the 
plaintiff seeks from the court would alleviate or compensate the 
plaintiff for the complained of injury.135 To illustrate, in Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., the plaintiff, a mother of a child born out of wedlock, was 
seeking to obtain child support through an injunction forcing the state 
to prosecute the child’s father criminally for failure to pay.136 After 
recognizing that she “does have an interest in the support of her 
child,”137 the Court found that it would not hear the case because 
incarcerating the father would not necessarily lead to the mother getting 
child support: “Thus, if appellant were granted the requested relief, it 
would result only in the jailing of the child’s father. The prospect that 
 
131 Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of Redressability, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 85, 86 (2001). 
132 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1992) (“The short of the matter is 
that . . . any relief the District Court could have provided in this suit . . . was not likely to 
[redress the injury]. . . . There is no standing.”). 
133 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
134 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. 
v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
135 Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Stuart, 
702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
136 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614–15 (1973). 
137 Id. at 619. 
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prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, 
at best, be termed only speculative.”138 
State courts engage in a similar jurisdictional analysis under the 
doctrine of “mootness” or “justiciability.” Mirroring the elements of 
standing, under the doctrine, courts will dismiss cases unless there is 
“an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute,” 
the parties’ interests are “adverse,” “the matter in controversy” is 
“capable of being adjudicated by judicial power,” and “the 
determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the 
complainant.”139 Thus, in Adziovski v. Elezovski, the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals dismissed a case as moot where the relevant parties 
had moved to Macedonia, making it all but impossible for the district 
court to proceed.140 
The majority opinions in cases rejecting plaintiffs’ substantive 
claims for failing the redressability element of standing or practical 
relief requirement of mootness cast the decision as a necessary and 
inevitable outcome rather than a reflection of public policy debates. 
The dissenting opinions, however, make clear that the justices and 
judges themselves differ substantially as to whether it was necessary 
for the court to deny the plaintiffs’ rights. In Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, for example, the dissent described the limitation imposed by 
the Court, including redressability, as “what amounts to a slash-and-
burn expedition through the law of environmental standing,”141 in 
which it could not join because “[t]he very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection 
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”142 
 
138 Id. at 618. 
139 Adziovski v. Elezovski, 985 A.2d 345, 347 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). 
140 Id. at 347 (“[I]t is exceedingly unlikely that the trial court could further entertain the 
matter because neither party can reasonably be made available to appear in court to pursue 
their respective claims on remand.”). 
141 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
142 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); see 
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 694 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority opinion for increasing pleading standards and heightening the burden for Bivens 
claim); Lieberman v. Univ. of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, S.J., 
dissenting) (dissent from ruling that damages were unavailable to plaintiff under Title IX 
for alleged sex discrimination); Laurence H. Tribe, Death By A Thousand Cuts: 
Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 23, 70 (2007) (discussing limitations on Bivens claims that have resulted in inadequate 
remedies). 
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Beyond overt use by the courts to limit jurisdiction, scholars 
employing the remedies perspective have identified several other 
doctrinal areas in which courts appear to be covertly restricting 
substantive rights to accommodate concerns about what remedy would 
otherwise follow from them. Examples include judges limiting the 
scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure in order to avoid applying the exclusionary rule,143 
restricting the definition of what constitutes a human rights violation in 
order to avoid the “collateral costs” implicated in imposing an 
“effective remedy” for such violations,144 and increasing the threshold 
requirement of prejudice under the harmless error doctrine to avoid 
reversing convictions even when substantive rights were infringed.145 
Adopting this perspective, it is possible that judges are well aware 
of social scientific theory and evidence showing that non-purposeful 
discrimination occurs and is a cause, in fact, of systematic injury to 
members of protected classes like racial minorities. The judges may, 
however, be concerned about the remedies implications of recognizing 
a substantive right to be free from such discrimination. Indeed, if non-
purposeful discrimination is pervasive and there are no validated 
interventions that can prevent it,—or those that are available are so 
onerous as to be impractical—then won’t the court end up finding 
everyone liable for continuing violations that neither money damages 
nor injunctive relief can reliably stop? As a result, judges may interpret 
substantive antidiscrimination doctrine in a way that addresses some 
harm but avoids what they might regard as the most significant 
practical remedies problems. 
  
 
143 Coenen, supra note 106, at 1266–67. 
144 Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in 
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693 (2008); see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights 
Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (2010); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 
421–75 (2012). 
145 Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 71 
(2002). 
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Figure 3 illustrates this explanation. 
Figure 3 
  
The remedies perspective thus offers an alternative explanation to 
judicial ignorance for the existence and persistence of an 
antidiscrimination law-science gap, and one with very different 
implications. If the gap is caused by a lack of knowledge, then efforts 
at closing the gap should be focused on educating judges about the 
relevant psychological science and proffering evidence of its 
applicability to the cases before them. However, if the gap is 
attributable to a judicial perception that there are no acceptable 
remedies for certain types of discrimination, then the focus should be 
on developing or emphasizing available practical interventions and de-
emphasizing the judicial or social costs of implementing them. 
C. Two Antidiscrimination Law Case Studies 
Does judicial ignorance of the relevant social scientific theory and 
associated evidence of harm or remedies concerns better explain the 
law-science gap? To answer this question, this Part reviews major 
developments in two doctrinal areas related to discretionary decisions 
that result in discriminatory outcomes: the death penalty and use of 
discretionary criteria in employment decisions. If the 
antidiscrimination law-science gap is caused primarily by a lack of 
judicial knowledge, then we would expect to see that judges who are 
presented with the relevant social science and strong evidence of injury 
from non-purposeful discrimination to recognize a substantive right to 
be free from it. As the following examples illustrate, however, social 
scientific theory and statistical evidence may sometimes have that 
effect but, ultimately, providing such information has not been a 
successful strategy. In defining the scope of substantive rights to be 
free from discrimination in the context of the death penalty and hiring 
and promotion decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has, at various 
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points, recognized the relevant social science and associated evidence 
of injury. But in each area, when they were later presented with more 
sophisticated research and evidence of injury, they checked or 
restricted the rights rather than advancing them. As these latter 
doctrinal changes are often accompanied by more and more rigorous 
social scientific information, they are inconsistent with the judicial 
ignorance explanation. They are, however, consistent with efforts by 
the Court to balance and adjust substantive rights in response to 
concerns about the availability, acceptability, and costs of remedies for 
non-purposeful discrimination. 
1. The Death Penalty 
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held by a bare majority that 
imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment when it is imposed at the almost complete discretion of 
the judge or jury.146 The case, Furman v. Georgia, involved the 
consolidated appeal of three capital sentences, one for murder, two for 
rape.147 In their concurrences and dissents the members of the Court 
debated the issue of whether the prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishment” was limited to especially “barbaric” forms of torture, or if 
it also encompassed the arbitrary or inconsistent imposition of the death 
penalty.148 For the dissenting justices, perhaps the most significant 
factor was that, going back as far as anyone might care to look, death 
has unquestionably been an acceptable form of criminal punishment, 
and often one that was used quite liberally.149 Indeed, relying in large 
part on this history, just the year before, in McGautha v. California, the 
same Court held that state laws that placed the decision to impose the 
death penalty in capital cases in “the untrammeled discretion of the 
jury” did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.150 
The McGautha opinion, however, did not contain a discussion of 
race, gender, or class bias in the implementation of the death penalty. 
 
146 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
147 Id. at 239. 
148 Id. at 244–45. 
149 Id. at 382 (Burger, J., dissenting). See generally DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION’S 
FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (2011) (depicting, 
through a series of essays, the English criminal justice system and brutal punishments at the 
time the U.S. Constitution was written). 
150 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971), reh’g granted, judgment vacated 
sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). 
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Nor did the justices appear to consider the role that discretion might 
play in facilitating such bias. By the time they decided Furman, at least 
three of the justices had come to understand a system in which jurors 
or a judge have complete discretion to select which of a subset of those 
convicted of committing capital offenses are sentenced to death as 
producing unconstitutional racial discrimination.151 Having just 
decided that discretion did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
however, they shoehorned their equal protection concerns into an 
Eighth Amendment analysis. 
Justice Marshall, for example, asserted that a punishment could be 
cruel and unusual, and thus in violation of the Eighth Amendment, if it 
“is abhorrent to currently existing moral values.”152 Among these 
values is racial equality. Arguing that the Court’s endorsement of 
discretion in McGautha was “an open invitation to discrimination,” he 
then reviewed empirical evidence for racial and gender bias in 
administration of the death penalty from 1930 until 1968.153 Figure 4 
summarizes the racial disparities.154 
 
151 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
152 Id. at 333 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
153 Id. at 365. 
154 Id.; Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population 
Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and 
Other Urban Places in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Div., Working 
Paper No. 76, 2005), https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076 
/twps0076.pdf. 
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Using the proportion of Blacks and Whites in the U.S. population 
during this period as a reference, a basic analysis of the data shows that, 
overall, Blacks were approximately nine times as likely to be executed 
for murder and seventy-two times as likely to be executed for rape as 
Whites. Justice Marshall also observed that only about 1% of the 
people executed are women.155 
For his part, Justice Douglas argued more directly that 
discriminatory application of the death penalty was itself “unusual” and 
thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment: “It would seem to be 
incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 
‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, 
wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure 
that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”156 
Along with historical and anecdotal evidence, supporting his 
assertion that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment, Justice 
Douglas considered an empirical study of the outcomes of capital cases 
in Texas from 1924 to 1968.157 Overall, the results of the study 
suggested that Black defendants, as well as the “poor, young, and 
ignorant,” were more likely to receive the death penalty.158 With 
respect to race in particular, among capital offenders, 88.4% of Blacks 
 
155 Furman, 408 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
156 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
157 Id. at 250. 
158 Id. 
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were executed compared to only 79.8% of Whites,159 rates that 
suggested that Black offenders who were convicted of a capital offense 
were 1.11 times more at risk of receiving the death penalty than White 
offenders. Likening this outcome to the caste system in India, under 
which the Brahman were historically exempt from capital 
punishment,160 and the de facto operation of hypothetical laws 
shielding the wealthy from the death penalty or providing that only 
Blacks, the poor, or uneducated should be subject to it, Justice Douglas 
concluded that: “[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in 
their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and 
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal 
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ 
punishments.”161 
Finally, anchoring his Eighth Amendment analysis on evidence of 
the infrequent use of the death penalty, Justice Stewart asserted that the 
death sentences at issue “are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”162 Against this 
background, although “racial discrimination has not been proved,” he 
agreed that it did appear that “if any basis can be discerned for the 
selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally 
impermissible basis of race.”163 
In the decade following Furman, death penalty jurisprudence 
evolved rapidly as states enacted revised statutes designed to address 
the Court’s concerns.164 Racial bias and discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty are again not generally discussed in 
these opinions. Even so, the outcomes suggest that the Court was 
focused on constructing a constitutional doctrine that would protect 
defendants in the situations in which the social science presented in 
Furman indicated they were most likely to be vulnerable to racial bias: 
death penalty decisions made with unguided discretion generally and 
capital cases involving rape in particular. For example, four years after 
 
159 Id. at 250 n.15. 
160 Id. at 255. 
161 Id. at 256–57. 
162 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
163 Id. 
164 Thorough coverage is beyond the scope of this Article, but can be found elsewhere. 
See John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2012); Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, 
Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County 
Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2013). 
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Furman the Court held in Woodson v. North Carolina that it was 
unconstitutional to make the death penalty mandatory for first degree 
murder in part because of historical evidence that jurors would simply 
continue to exercise unguided discretion about who they convicted.165 
The same day, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the 
administration of the death penalty was constitutional under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, so long as procedural protections guided 
and limited the bases on which it was imposed, and provisions for 
appellate review to ensure that it was not used only in a rare, arbitrary, 
or discriminatory way.166 A year later, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court 
held that the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment for rape 
of an adult woman.167 Thus, within half of a decade of Furman and 
without ever overtly discussing racial bias, the Court effectively 
outlawed uses of the death penalty in precisely the conditions under 
which the social science presented to them and cited by Justice 
Marshall indicated that it was most likely to be discriminatory. 
Sixteen years after McGautha, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court 
again squarely engaged with the issue of whether demonstrable racial 
disparities in the outcomes of capital cases, which were assumed to 
result from discretion of prosecutors and the jury, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.168 As part of its 
argument, the defendant presented the Court with sociologist David 
Baldus’s analysis of the outcomes of over 2,000 contemporary murder 
cases in Georgia.169 The main results, summarized in Figure 5,170 
showed that prosecutors sought and jurors awarded the death penalty 
substantially more often when the victims were White than when they 
were Black, suggesting a lower value for Black than White lives. 
Moreover, this “race-of-victim effect”171 was larger when the 
defendant in the case was Black, suggesting that killing someone who 
is White is seen by prosecutors and jurors as particularly egregious 
when the person who does so is Black. 
 
165 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). 
166 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976). 
167 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977). 
168 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282–83 (1987). 
169 Id. at 286. 
170 Id. at 286–87. Bars on the left panel represent the percent of cases in which 
prosecutors sought the death penalty and those on the right panel represent the percent of 
cases in which the jury awarded the death penalty. 
171 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 6 (1990). 
GIRVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2016  12:38 PM 
2016] When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial Realism 395 
in Antidiscrimination Law 
Figure 5: Percent of Death Penalty Prosecutions and 
Awards for Capital Offenses by Race of Defendant and 
Race of Victim 
To rule out the possibility that differences in aggravating and 
mitigating factors could explain the racial differences, Baldus 
conducted additional analysis statistically controlling for thirty-nine 
alternative non-racial predictors and found that the racial bias 
persisted.172 Further, as was the case with Texas data presented to the 
Court in Furman, overall, his analysis showed that “black defendants 
were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other 
defendants.”173 Finally, relying upon a statistical model that controlled 
for an even larger set of 230 non-racial explanations, Baldus concluded 
that racial discrepancies did not exist either for “tremendously 
aggravated” cases, in which there was consensus that the death penalty 
was appropriate or in those cases where jurors were most likely to 
agree, based on the circumstances, that it was not appropriate.174 
Rather, “[i]t’s only in the mid-range of cases where the decision makers 
have a real choice as to what to do. If there’s room for the exercise of 
discretion, then the [racial] factors begin to play a role.”175 
The Supreme Court accepted the social scientific evidence presented 
by Baldus as valid.176 And both the majority and dissent cited 
 
172 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 287 n.5. 
175 Id. (second alteration in original). For a discussion of the impact of discretion on use 
of stereotypes in legal decision-making, see generally, e.g., Girvan, supra note 18. 
176 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279. 
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Washington v. Davis for the proposition that a “defendant who alleges 
an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence 
of purposeful discrimination.’”177 Under this standard, while the 
empirical analysis before the Court showed that there was an increased, 
race-based risk of receiving the death penalty, it did not “prove” that 
race intentionally entered into the sentencing decision.178 Nor did it 
indicate that the system was “arbitrary and capricious in 
application.”179 On this basis, the Court held that use of the guided 
discretionary practices under these circumstances did not violate the 
Constitution.180 Thus, an essentially identical discriminatory effect 
size, 1.1, to the one that motivated Justice Douglas to find the death 
penalty unconstitutional in Furman was found to be constitutionally 
insignificant here. 
Why, when presented with some of the most rigorous social science 
available, did the Court not recognize a constitutional right to be free 
from the remaining racial bias as well? Was it for lack of knowledge or 
information about the potential for bias? Or did concerns about 
available remedies and what it would take to remove racial 
discrimination prevent the Court from taking this last step? The 
evolution of constitutional doctrine regarding the death penalty over 
this period generally, and the majority opinion in McCleskey in 
particular, support the latter. First, the Court was not silent on the 
possible influence of bias, nor did it deny that it might be at play here. 
To the contrary, Justice Powell, writing for the majority in McCleskey, 
accepted the results of David Baldus’s research. And he acknowledged 
that there continued to be “some risk of racial prejudice influencing a 
jury’s decision.”181 It was simply his view that the risk described by 
Baldus’s research was not large enough to be “constitutionally 
unacceptable.”182 Second, in the years between Furman and 
McCleskey, the Court appears to have been responsive to the social 
science presented to them in Furman. Over that period they held that 
the most significant sources of discrimination in awarding the death 
penalty (i.e., the unguided discretion and capital punishment for rape 
identified in the research reviewed by Justice Marshall) were 
 
177 Id. at 292; see also id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976)). 
178 Id. at 292–99; see also id. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
179 Id. at 308. 
180 Id. at 297–99. 
181 Id. at 308. 
182 Id. at 308–09. 
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unconstitutional.183 And Justice Powell pointedly observed in 
McCleskey that the Court had been “engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to 
eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system” in other 
contexts, like jury selection.184 Third, suggesting that the Court fully 
understood that discretion presented the most significant continuing 
source of discrimination, Powell’s opinion dwelt at length on the 
countervailing importance of juror discretion in deciding who should 
be given the death penalty: 
Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process 
is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is 
invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias 
in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal 
justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal 
defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a 
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia 
capital sentencing process.185 
Finally, the majority opinion suggests that the Court believed that 
the level of discrimination identified by Baldus was so widespread and 
the steps necessary for governments to reduce or eliminate it so “totally 
unrealistic”186 that recognizing a constitutional right to be free from it 
 
183 See discussion supra notes 165, 167 and accompanying text. 
184 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309. 
185 Id. at 313. 
186 Id. at 319 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976)). To the extent the 
majority of Justices believe that the law is impotent to remedy widespread racial bias, they 
echo the sentiment of the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“The argument 
also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights 
cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We 
cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it 
must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a 
voluntary consent of individuals. As was said by the court of appeals of New York in People 
v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448: ‘This end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by 
laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are 
designed to operate. When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens 
equal rights before the law, and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has 
accomplished the end for which it was organized, and performed all of the functions 
respecting social advantages with which it is endowed.’ Legislation is powerless to eradicate 
racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt 
to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil 
and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or 
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United States 
cannot put them upon the same plane.”). 
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would probably undermine the criminal justice system, something that 
they were unwilling to do.187 
2. Discretionary Standards in Employment Discrimination 
A second area in which antidiscrimination doctrine appears to have 
developed in response to judicial knowledge of the relevant social 
scientific evidence, and then became checked or restricted based on 
remedial considerations, is that involving claims for employment 
discrimination under Title VII for use of discretionary standards. In 
1988, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that discretionary employment practices, when paired with 
appropriate statistical evidence showing discrimination, could operate 
as an actionable conduit for discrimination under a disparate impact 
theory.188 In the case, an African American employee of a small bank, 
having approximately eighty employees, applied for promotion four 
times.189 Each time, the bank, which lacked “precise and formal criteria 
for evaluating candidates,” relied upon the “subjective judgment of 
supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the 
nature of the jobs to be filled” in order to select who was promoted.190 
Each time the plaintiff was passed over in favor of a White applicant.191 
In response, she sued her employer under Title VII alleging both 
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.192 
The case was styled, and initially certified, as a class action on behalf 
of all Black individuals who applied to be or were employees of the 
 
187 Brennan, writing for the dissent, critiques the majority for their unwillingness to 
address the issue. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next 
states that its unwillingness to regard petitioner’s evidence as sufficient is based in part on 
the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s claim would open the door to widespread 
challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing. Taken on its face, such a statement seems 
to suggest a fear of too much justice. Yet surely the majority would acknowledge that if 
striking evidence indicated that other minority groups, or women, or even persons with 
blond hair, were disproportionately sentenced to death, such a state of affairs would be 
repugnant to deeply rooted conceptions of fairness. The prospect that there may be more 
widespread abuse than McCleskey documents may be dismaying, but it does not justify 
complete abdication of our judicial role. The Constitution was framed fundamentally as a 
bulwark against governmental power, and preventing the arbitrary administration of 
punishment is a basic ideal of any society that purports to be governed by the rule of law.” 
(citation omitted)). 
188 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999–1000 (1988). 
189 Id. at 982. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 984. 
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bank during the relevant period.193 With respect to applicants, in 
support of her allegations, Watson’s expert proffered a basic 
descriptive statistical analysis showing, among other things, that the 
bank had hired 89 of 533 White applicants (16.7%) but only 6 of 144 
Black applicants (4.2%) over the relevant period.194 With respect to the 
employees, the expert’s analysis showed that, in four separate annual 
evaluations, the bank’s Black employees were rated, on largely 
subjective criteria,195 an average of 11 to 15 points lower than non-
Black employees.196 When the effects of experience and job grade at 
the time of hiring were controlled for, the average differences increased 
to approximately 34 to 40 points.197 In terms of outcomes, the statistics 
also showed that, as compared to White employees, these Black 
employees: 
• Were promoted at slower rates (average annual increase in grade 
.53 versus .18, respectively), 
• Received lower wage increases (average annual increase 14.9% 
versus 12.0%, respectively), 
• Topped out at lower job grades (average final grade 5.29 versus 
4.13, respectively), and 
• Were paid lower salaries (average per month $917.15 versus 
$861.47, respectively).198 
 
193 Id. at 983. 
194 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 811 n.20 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting), vacated, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
195 Id. at 812–13 & n.26 (“Each supervisor rates the employees under his or her 
supervision in twelve categories on a scale from zero to seven, eight, nine, or ten. The 
categories are: (1) Accuracy of work; (2) Alertness; (3) Personal Appearance; (4) 
Supervisor-co-worker relations; (5) Quantity of Work; (6) Physical Fitness; (7) Attendance; 
(8) Dependability; (9) Stability (‘The ability to withstand pressure and remain calm in most 
situations’); (10) Drive (‘Ambition’); (11) Friendliness and Courtesy; and (12) Job 
Knowledge. . . . Few of these categories have much objective content. For example, 
‘personal appearance,’ ‘drive,’ and ‘friendliness and courtesy’ are clearly subjective on their 
face. While ‘Quantity of Work’ could lend itself to objective measurement, the rating system 
itself is also subjective: 0–1, ‘does not meet minimum requirement’; 2–3, ‘does just enough 
to get by’; 4, ‘volume of work is satisfactory’; 5–6. ‘very industrious does more than is 
required’; 7–8, ‘superior work production record.’ This type of subjective measurement 
lends itself to discriminatory bias, be it conscious or unconscious.”). 
196 Id. at 812–13. 
197 Id. at 813. 
198 Id. at 813 n.29. 
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The significant racial discrepancies remained even after controlling for 
other factors such as employee education and experience.199 
Finding that the putative applicant and employee class members 
lacked a common question of law or fact under Rule 23(a), the district 
court decertified the broader class and split it in two, one for applicants 
and another for employees.200 Subsequent evidence showed that the 
class of Black employees, which consisted of just eleven 
individuals,201 was too small to satisfy the numerosity requirement of 
Rule 23(a).202 Accordingly, the employee class was decertified.203 The 
district court nevertheless went on to hear the plaintiff’s individual 
claim under a disparate treatment theory, ultimately finding against 
her.204 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority, affirmed that plaintiffs in disparate treatment claims were 
required to prove “that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or 
motive.”205 Under a disparate impact theory, however, the plaintiff 
could succeed by proving only that employment practices had 
“significant adverse effects on protected groups,” whether or not she 
could show that the practices were adopted with discriminatory 
intent.206 The issue was whether an employer’s policy of relying upon 
its supervisors’ discretion could qualify as such a practice, an issue on 
which the circuit courts had split.207 
Justice O’Connor thought that it should.208 In support of this 
position, she acknowledged that it was reasonable, particularly for 
small businesses that could not afford to develop and validate other 
measures, to rely upon supervisors’ experience and judgment.209 As 
such, a policy or practice of doing so for promotion decisions should 
not itself give rise to a claim. Indeed, the consequence of holding 
otherwise would likely be that employers would move to a quota 
 
199 Id. at 813 n.30. 
200 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 983 (1988). 
201 Watson, 798 F.2d at 813–14 n.31 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. at 799 (majority opinion). 
203 Id. at 797 n.10. 
204 Id. at 797. 
205 Watson, 487 U.S. at 986. 
206 Id. at 986–87. 
207 See id. at 988. 
208 Id. at 991. 
209 Id. at 990–91. For an alternative solution, see Girvan & Deason, supra note 8, at 1097. 
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system to insulate themselves from liability, itself an unacceptable 
outcome and a violation of the Constitution.210 
Even if relying upon discretionary criteria was reasonable, however, 
it did not mean employers could never be liable for doing so. To the 
contrary, they could be held liable if the supervisors had discriminatory 
motives or were impacted by what we would now call implicit bias: 
Furthermore, even if one assumed that any such discrimination can 
be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the 
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain. 
In this case, for example, petitioner was apparently told at one point 
that the teller position was a big responsibility with “a lot of money  
. . . for blacks to have to count.” Such remarks may not prove 
discriminatory intent, but they do suggest a lingering form of the 
problem that Title VII was enacted to combat. If an employer’s 
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking [sic] has 
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible 
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s 
proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply. In both 
circumstances, the employer’s practices may be said to “adversely 
affect [an individual’s] status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”211 
Thus, expressly recognizing the phenomenon of non-purposeful 
discrimination and its relationship to discretion, the Court held that 
relying upon discretionary or subjective standards could support a 
discrimination claim.212 
To do so, the Court held that the plaintiff must also be able to satisfy 
certain other evidentiary thresholds.213 These include: (1) 
identification of a specific employment practice, of which reliance on 
supervisor discretion could be one; (2) causation, often in the form of 
statistical evidence of disparities; and (3) if an employer asserts that it 
used that practice out of a business necessity, that “other tests or 
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would 
also serve the employer’s legitimate interest,” including that of cost and 
the burden of implementation.214 Having established these standards, 
and with the express recognition that “[i]t may be that the relevant data 
base is too small to permit any meaningful statistical analysis,” the 
 
210 Watson, 487 U.S. at 992. 
211 Id. at 990–91 (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(2)). 
212 Id. at 991. 
213 Id. at 998. 
214 Id. at 994–98. 
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Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the 
plaintiff could satisfy them.215 
Twenty-three years after Watson, the Supreme Court was presented 
with much more rigorous social scientific analysis and substantially 
more sophisticated empirical evidence of widespread injury from non-
purposeful discrimination. Just as in McCleskey, the Court responded 
to this information by checking or restricting the plaintiffs’ substantive 
rights rather than providing a remedy for their breach. In Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, three plaintiffs brought a class action against Wal-
Mart, the United States’ largest retailer, for discrimination against 
female employees in pay and promotions.216 The putative class 
included approximately 1.5 million women and implicated each of the 
retailer’s 3,400 stores.217 
The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that, with minimal 
restrictions, Wal-Mart relied upon the subjective decisions of its store 
managers for compensation and promotion decisions.218 In support of 
their allegations that this resulted in a discriminatory impact, the 
plaintiffs provided expert testimony from a sociologist.219 He 
described the conditions under which social scientific research suggests 
that use of discretionary criteria is most likely to result in gender bias 
against employees: where the employee’s gender is inconsistent with 
the stereotypical employee for a position (e.g., women in leadership or 
management positions, which are stereotypically held by men, but not 
in customer service positions, which are stereotypically held by 
women).220 In addition, the plaintiffs provided statistical evidence that 
was consistent with this testimony.221 It showed, for example, that 65% 
of the hourly, but only 33% of the salaried management, employees 
were women.222 This was a result of “a statistically significant shortfall 
of women being promoted into each of the in-store management 
classifications over the entire class period.”223 Where men took on 
average 2.86 years to be promoted to assistant manager and 8.64 years 
to reach store manager, women took 4.38 years and 10.12 years to reach 
 
215 Id. at 1000. 
216 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 153 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 146. 
223 Id. at 160. 
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the same positions, respectively.224 Similarly, within the hourly ranks, 
customer service positions had the largest percentages of women (85% 
to 90%)225 and there was substantial sex-based segregation by work 
area (e.g., 89.5% of cashiers were women while 75% of hardware sales 
associates were men).226 Beyond these differences, and even after 
controlling for other factors such as seniority and performance, “total 
earnings paid to women ranged between 5 and 15 percent less than total 
earnings paid to similarly situated men in each year of the class 
period.”227 Finally, the plaintiffs showed that Wal-Mart’s percentage 
of female in-store managers, 34.5%, was substantially lower than that 
of other large, national retailers, which averaged 56.5%.228 Based on 
this evidence, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, lost 
pay, and punitive damages.229 
The district court certified the class.230 Because of Wal-mart’s size, 
the class was by far the largest in U.S. history.231 Recognizing that it 
was granting class certification in the fiftieth anniversary year of Brown 
v. Board of Education, however, the district court did not shy away 
from the scope of the case.232 Rather, adopting a conventional rights-
 
224 Id. at 161. 
225 Id. at 146. 
226 Id. at 156 n.24. 
227 Id. at 156. 
228 Id. at 165. 
229 Id. at 141. 
230 Id. at 188. 
231 Principal Brief for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at 1, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 474 
F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720), 2004 WL 3080794. 
232 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142. Setting aside romantic notions associated with Brown, 
the willingness of the courts to do what it took to dismantle segregation was actually rather 
short lived. Indeed, although Brown articulated the right to equality and integration in 1954, 
it was only between Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, 391 U.S. 
430, 437–38 (1968) and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974) that the Supreme 
Court actually supported the remedial efforts necessary to realize this goal. As a result, de 
facto segregation in many areas of the United States is now worse than de jure discrimination 
under Plessy’s separate but equal regime. See generally THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: MENDEZ, BROWN, AND BEYOND 
(Kristi L. Bowman ed., 2015) (discussing the legal and policy reforms that have been 
achieved and those that are still needed to achieve the goals of Brown); GARY ORFIELD & 
CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES, HISTORIC 
REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION 
STRATEGIES (2007), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration    
-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integra 
tion-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701 (2007) has supported resegregation in U.S. public schools to the detriment of 
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focused perspective in which violations of substantive rights lead to 
employer liability, it viewed the scope of the alleged violation as 
irrelevant to, or even supporting, its decision: “This anniversary serves 
as a reminder of the importance of the courts in addressing the denial 
of equal treatment under the law wherever and by whomever it 
occurs.”233 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court did not seem to share 
this view.234 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged the Court’s 
basic observation in Watson that “an employer’s undisciplined system 
of subjective decisionmaking [sic] [can have] precisely the same effects 
as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination.”235 
At no point, however, did he endorse the possibility of liability for 
anything but intentional discrimination or discriminatory impacts from 
specific, affirmative practices such as use of aptitude tests or 
educational achievements. To the contrary, the majority opinion holds 
that a policy of relying upon discretion is not an actionable policy at 
all: 
 The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing 
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. On its face, 
of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice 
that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a 
policy against having uniform employment practices.236 
On this basis, after explicitly rejecting the relevant social scientific 
theory, the Court reiterated “that merely proving that the discretionary 
system has produced a racial or sexual disparity is not enough.”237 And 
 
students of all races); GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., 
SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION (2001), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf (detailing the benefits of desegregation in 
U.S. schools). 
233 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142. This observation is somewhat ironic in light of the 
substantial restrictions the Court has placed on the ability of courts and communities to 
remedy the substantive rights recognized in Brown. See generally THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL 
AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, supra note 232; ORFIELD & LEE, supra 
note 232; ORFIELD, supra note 232. 
234 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011). Nor did the dissent at 
the court of appeals, which the majority there noted: “Ten times the dissent points out the 
large class size, referring to the ‘1.5 million’ women alleging discrimination as a reason to 
reject certification.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 578 n.3 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
235 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (alteration in original) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988)). 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 2555. 
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it ultimately held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23 and thus that the class should be decertified.238 
As with the death penalty jurisprudence, the evolution of liability for 
discrimination resulting from discretionary decision-making is more 
consistent with judges denying a substantive claim out of remedial 
concerns than doing so from a lack of knowledge of the relevant social 
science. Contrary to the latter explanation, the majority opinion in 
Watson was based upon an expressed understanding that plaintiffs, at 
least in the aggregate, ought to have a right to be free from non-
purposeful discrimination that has a disparate impact. Similarly, in 
Dukes, the Supreme Court had not only this precedent but the benefit 
of additional briefing and expert testimony about the problem of 
systematic discrimination from implicit forms of bias in discretionary 
decision-making. Nevertheless, it expressly rejected the relevance of 
the science and ultimately treated the disparate impact claim as if it was 
limited to situations in which the harm is traceable to a directive to take 
specific discriminatory actions.  
By comparison, and supporting the remedies explanation, Watson 
involved a relatively small employer and a class of eleven individuals 
which was ultimately too small to satisfy the numerousity requirements 
of Rule 23. On the one hand, particularly given the difficulties the 
plaintiff faced on the issues on remand, the situation and precedent 
posed little threat of requiring substantial judicial intervention. On the 
other hand, the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart—or more precisely their 
counsel—structured the putative class to place the problem of 
pervasive, subtle sources of discrimination squarely before the Court. 
As the district court realized in certifying the class, given the asserted 
basis of the claim against Wal-Mart and requested remedies (i.e., 
injunctive relief), recognizing a right to proceed with a nation-wide 
class of 1.5 million women was tantamount to committing the court to 
attempt to resolve implicit gender bias in the private sector. 
III 
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 
The two examples described above are not the only ones that 
demonstrate a pattern of expansion and contraction of substantive 
 
238 Id. at 2557. 
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antidiscrimination rights.239 They are intended to illustrate how courts 
hearing claims for discrimination have, at various times, been 
responsive to psychological science regarding implicit bias and the 
associated problems with discretionary decisions. They also show that 
litigants who have relied upon the strategy of presenting more or better 
information about the relevant social scientific theory and 
methodologically rigorous evidence of a resulting injury have not 
always been successful. To the contrary, at least in these examples, the 
more detailed the science and rigorous the methods supporting the 
assertion that racial bias caused widespread injury, the less willing the 
Supreme Court was to recognize a substantive right to recover for it. 
This pattern runs directly contrary to what we would expect if the lack 
of knowledge of judges was the primary barrier to closing the 
antidiscrimination law-science gap. But, considering the cases 
involved from the perspective of the majority (i.e., the Justices that the 
plaintiffs needed to convince), the results appear to support the 
remedies perspective. 
Consistent with work on implicit bias, the social scientific theory 
and data presented to the Court in McCleskey and Dukes suggested that, 
as a factual matter, criminal defendants and employees are treated 
differently because of race or sex. To the former, by holding that the 
Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty in rape cases and 
in the unguided discretion of jurors, and by allowing parties to 
challenge race-based peremptory strikes, the Court had already picked 
the low hanging remedies fruit. Recognizing that a right to be free from 
the sort of discrimination that remained would thus require the 
judiciary to engage in a far more substantial, searching, and 
fundamental process of systemic change. Indeed, it is only from the 
remedies perspective that it makes sense that a majority would cite 
studies showing racial disparities in prison sentences240 in support of 
its position that the Constitution did not provide a right to relief: 
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into 
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal 
 
239 For example, see the evolution of law on the extent to which structural discrepancies 
can be used to state a claim for unequal pay through County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 
U.S. 161 (1981), Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982), American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v. 
Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, as recognized in Texas Department 
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct 2507, 
2523 (2015), and Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1990). 
240 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 n.38 (1987). 
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justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application 
to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties. Thus, if we 
accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly 
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with 
similar claims as to other types of penalty.241 
To the latter doctrinal area, from a remedies perspective, it is one 
thing to recognize that implicit racial bias was likely to influence the 
decisions of a few managers in a small bank in Texas about a few of its 
Black employees. While it may be difficult to stamp out that sort of 
bias itself, the scope of the problem seems manageable. It is entirely 
another to consider how implicit gender bias might impact millions of 
decisions of tens of thousands of managers who live in a range of 
geographical regions and have different backgrounds and beliefs. In 
that context, social scientific theory and evidence that emphasize how 
non-purposeful discrimination is pervasive and robust would only 
exacerbate perceptions that courts may be required to undertake 
extraordinary, and potentially socially and politically costly, efforts to 
adequately address an intractable problem. Faced with the need to 
undertake such efforts, it is perhaps understandable why, as depicted in 
Figure 3, courts might opt to restrict the scope of plaintiffs’ substantive 
rights to the point that remedies implications present an acceptable 
burden for the courts and are perceived to have some reasonable chance 
of success. 
The remedies perspective thus provides a potentially more accurate 
alternative explanation for the development of antidiscrimination 
doctrine in these areas to simple lack of knowledge. Even accepting 
that it is descriptively accurate, however, it may beg the ultimate 
question. There is certainly precedent for judges being willing to take 
extraordinary steps to remedy serious civil rights issues.242 In light of 
these cases, it is reasonable to interpret judges’ reliance upon subjective 
terms like “acceptable” and “reasonable” in the remedies account as 
merely concealing the root cause of their unwillingness to expand 
 
241 Id. at 314–15 (internal citations omitted). 
242 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1995); Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 
189, 213–14 (1973); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 
(1968); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954). For a discussion 
and critique of such judicial activism in civil rights, see, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION, 86–90 (1978); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State 
Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978). 
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antidiscrimination rights: Their objection, on ideological grounds, to 
such substantive rights themselves.243 
This critique treats motivations as the primary determinant as to 
whether someone undertakes a task. Psychological theory, however, 
has long suggested that engagement with and performance in a task is 
a function of both motivation and ability.244 All else being equal, when 
deciding to undertake a task, as peoples’ abilities (e.g., knowledge, 
skill, and experience) in a given domain increase, how motivated they 
need to be in order to decide to work toward a fixed goal in that domain 
(i.e., how much effort they must be willing to expend) decreases.245 
Similarly, people can and do compensate for a lack of ability when they 
are highly motivated to achieve their goals.246 Thus, however desirable 
some people find an outcome in the abstract, they will tend to cease any 
efforts to achieve their goal if they do not believe they have the ability 
to do so with the effort they are willing to expend.247 
Within the context of this theory, judges’ ideologies, values, 
attitudes, and beliefs regarding equality in particular—among other 
factors—are likely to influence how motivated they are to attempt to 
 
243 For sources providing evidence that Justices’ and judges’ political ideology are fairly 
strong predictors of their votes in civil rights cases, see LEE EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR 
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
(2013); Jeffery A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
244 See generally Norman H. Anderson & Clifford A. Butzin, Performance = Motivation 
x Ability: An Integration-theoretical Analysis, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 598 
(1974) (analyzing a mathematical formula that can predict performance based on the 
subject’s motivation and ability); Ramadhar Singh & Shivganesh Bhargava, Motivation, 
Ability, and Exam Performance: Tests of Hypotheses of Cultural Difference and Task 
Difficulty, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 466 (1985) (finding cultural differences in 
the theory of motivation); Allan Wigfield & Jacquelynne S. Eccles, Expectancy—Value 
Theory of Achievement Motivation, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 68 (2000) (discussing 
the theory of motivation). 
245 See sources cited supra note 244. 
246 See sources cited supra note 244. 
247 For example, the theory of planned behavior describes how perceived behavioral 
control (i.e., people’s confidence in their ability to successfully accomplish a goal) is 
strongly related to whether they undertake actions in furtherance of the goal. See generally, 
e.g., Icek Ajzen & Thomas J. Madden, Prediction of Goal-Directed Behavior: Attitudes, 
Intentions, and Perceived Behavioral Control, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 453 
(1986) (proposing the theory of planned behavior); Icek Ajzen, The Theory of Planned 
Behavior, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179 (1991) 
(discussing needed research into the theory of planned behavior); Christopher J. Armitage 
& Mark Conner, Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A Meta-Analytic Review, 40 
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 471 (2001) (reviewing the research on the theory of planned 
behavior); Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change, 
84 PSYCHOL. REV. 191 (1977) (describing the psychological theory of self-efficacy). 
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redress injuries from implicit bias. As explained in prior research, there 
is reason to believe that ideological conservatives are more ambivalent 
about the costs and benefits of inequality than ideological liberals.248 
This would translate into lower motivation to engage with the issue or 
attempt to remedy it. Even so, at any level of motivation up to the 
inflection point beyond which a hypothetical judge affirmatively 
desired to increase discrimination, the probability of the judge deciding 
to engage with the problem of implicit bias will be a function of the 
judge’s perception of whether the amount of effort that they are willing 
to expend can successfully get the job done.249 This is where the 
relationship between the relative scope of the harm and perceived 
availability and efficacy of remedies for it may become a critical factor 
in judicial decisions about whether to expand or contract substantive 
antidiscrimination rights. If judges perceive that the breadth of injury 
from non-conscious discrimination far outstrips research on how to 
address it, then only the most motivated of them are likely to commit 
themselves or the judicial system to explore how to fix it. 
Contemporary opinions engaging directly with and accepting research 
on implicit bias, but refusing to recognize a right to be free from harm 
caused by it, provide some evidence that this is exactly what many 
judges believe the current state of affairs to be. 
[T]he disparity in sentencing of these individuals who are so similarly 
situated, save race or ethnicity, at least requires consideration of what 
impact unconscious preferences or biases may have played in the 
disparity. 
 Because there is no “cure” for completely ridding ourselves of 
these hidden influences, an appreciation for their existence and an 
awareness of how they impact decision making will go a long way in 
helping to improve our justice system. Continuing education, 
discussions, and research will aid these endeavors.250 
With this perspective and the goal of exploring how to close or 
bridge the antidiscrimination law-psychology gap in mind, the 
remainder of the section proceeds in two parts. The first critiques what 
is known about how to successfully address implicit bias.251 It shows 
that, while there is a substantial amount of research and theory about 
what can attenuate the impact of implicit bias, thus far this work has 
 
248 Girvan, supra note 6, at 55–57. 
249 See id. at 44. 
250 State v. Sherman, No. 97840, 2012 WL 3765041 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012). 
251 For a collection of resources on and suggestions about how to address implicit bias, 
see Girvan, supra note 6, and infra Appendix A. 
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produced far more recommendations rather than validated 
interventions. Accordingly, a court faced with the problem of 
remedying implicit bias would likely have to be willing to supervise or 
commission an intervention development project or be satisfied with 
substitutionary relief (e.g., money damages), neither of which may be 
particularly appealing. Given this, the second part suggests ways in 
which advocates may be able to overcome remedies concerns in 
antidiscrimination litigation. 
A. Addressing Implicit Bias 
Over the last twenty years, researchers have explored questions that 
could assist a judge to craft a remedy for implicit bias: When it is most 
influential, when it is not, what can cause implicit biases to change, and 
what is not effective for doing so?252 Insights from this work have been 
expertly summarized elsewhere in a way that is accessible to legal 
audiences.253 However, because most of this work involves laboratory 
studies designed to test the basic psychological theory regarding 
psychological processes associated with implicit bias, outside the 
laboratory the insights produce only general guidance and 
recommendations, not field-tested interventions. As researchers in 
applied social scientific fields like education have learned, the 
difference between the two can be substantial: 
Most change efforts in education over the past 25 years have met with 
limited success. Even when supported by federal or state government 
mandates, the level of successful implementation of innovative 
programs has been very low. Mann (1978) studied nationwide school 
reform initiatives and cited the success rate at about 20% for actual 
change in educational programs as a result of planned innovations. 
 
252 See generally Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and 
Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242; Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. 
Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice 
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
800 (2001); Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Prejudice, 7 SOC. & PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315 (2013) [hereinafter Reducing Implicit Prejudice]; Calvin K. Lai et 
al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative Investigation of 17 
Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1765 (2014); Laurie A. Rudman et al., 
“Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001). 
253 E.g., Kang et al., supra note 6; Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Resources for 
Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2016); see also Girvan, supra note 6; infra Appendix A. 
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Current data seem to indicate that little has changed in the past few 
decades.254 
Indeed, the entire field of implementation science is devoted to 
examining all that needs to be done to successfully translate theory 
produced in the laboratory to field settings.255 Further, notwithstanding 
calls made a decade ago to “devote special attention to the promise of 
‘debiasing’ actors,”256 few sustained efforts have been undertaken to 
do this work. One example of an attempt to do so is captured by the 
National Center for State Court’s report on pilot projects in California, 
Minnesota, and North Dakota to address implicit bias in legal decision-
making.257 The report recognizes that the ultimate goal of the field 
studies included reducing discriminatory behavior attributable to 
implicit bias: 
• Judges/court staff engage in activities to address their implicit 
biases. 
• There are observable changes in judicial and staff decisions, and 
behaviors. 
• Disparate case outcomes based on race and ethnicity are 
reduced.258 
Nevertheless, because of time and resource constraints, the primary 
outcome reported was the extent to which judges learned something 
about implicit bias and were satisfied with the training that they 
received, not whether the training actually reduced the impacts of 
implicit bias.259 
 Because the national project was available to work with the 
selected states for only a finite period of time, the focus was on 
developing a specific program and identifying the short-term 
 
254 Michael P. George et al., Implementing School-Wide Behavior Change: Lessons from 
the Field, 44 PSYCHOL. SCHOOLS 41, 41 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also K. 
Brigid Flannery et al., School-Wide Positive Behavior Support in High School: Early 
Lessons Learned, 11 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 177, 183–84 (2009). 
255 See, e.g., Susan Michie et al., The Behaviour Change Wheel: A New Method for 
Characterising and Designing Behaviour Change Interventions, 6 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 
42, 43 (2011). 
256 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 973; see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, 
at 962–63. 
257 PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS 
ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 6 (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/ 
media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx. 
258 Id. at 29–31. 
259 Id. at 6. 
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outcomes resulting from the program. The project examined how 
judges and court staff reacted to the information. It did not measure 
the long-term effects of education on implicit bias.260 
Thus, the primary, national research organization devoted to judicial 
reform through research and education was unable to conduct a 
sustained project to develop and adequately test an intervention for 
reducing the impacts of implicit bias in the courts. This is not unusual. 
Indeed, while there are numerous studies showing how implicit bias 
can be reduced in a laboratory,261 published descriptions of field tests 
of interventions that are successful in reducing implicit bias are few 
and far between.262 
It is not that psychologists who study implicit bias do not understand 
that more work is needed in this area. To the contrary, in their 
comprehensive review of work on implicit bias, Lai, Hoffman, and 
Nosek, conclude that, “[l]ooking forward, the next step is to investigate 
how these mechanisms can be utilized to reduce implicit prejudice for 
the practical interest of mitigating discrimination.”263 Until that work 
is done, however, asking judges to take on the task of supervising the 
development of remedies for implicit bias, or even asking them to build 
in strong incentives for others to do so themselves, is more likely to be 
an uphill battle. 
Here, the example of research on eyewitness testimony may provide 
guidance to psychologists on how to proceed. One of the fundamental 
differences between basic science lab research and field research 
exploring the malleability of implicit biases relates to the types of 
variables that have been and tend to be investigated—or not 
investigated as the case may be. Almost forty years ago, Gary Wells 
solved this problem and revolutionized the application of psychological 
science to assessments of the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in 
criminal trials by drawing a distinction between “estimator variables” 
and “system variables.”264 
 
260 Id. (internal cross-references omitted). 
261 See sources cited supra note 252. 
262 One notable example is the intervention described in Molly Carnes et al., The Effect 
of an Intervention to Break the Gender Bias Habit for Faculty at One Institution: A Cluster 
Randomized, Controlled Trial, 90 ACAD. MED. 221, 222 (2015); Patricia G. Devine et al., 
Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1269 (2012). 
263 Reducing Implicit Prejudice, supra note 252, at 326. 
264 Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and 
Estimator Values, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978). 
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The argument was that some of the variables that affect the accuracy 
of eyewitness reports were under the control (or potentially under the 
control) of the justice system (system variables) while others were 
not (estimator variables). For example, how eyewitnesses are 
interviewed by police and how eyewitnesses are instructed prior to 
viewing a lineup are system variables, because they can be controlled 
by the system that is collecting the eyewitness evidence. Other 
variables—such as cross-race versus within-race identifications or 
stress experienced by the witness during the event—cannot be 
controlled by the system.265 
Social psychologists can control both kinds of variables in their 
laboratory experiments. To the extent realistic analogues of system 
variables are included as both the independent and dependent variables, 
however, the results of their research can not only help after the fact to 
assess when the effect of interest (e.g., eyewitness error, discrimination 
from implicit bias) likely occurred, but also affirmatively suggest ways 
in which it could be prevented in advance of any adverse decision. 
Wells’s distinction, however, is not always attended to in basic 
science research and has been largely neglected in research exploring 
the malleability of implicit bias. To illustrate, of the nearly fifty studies 
reviewed by Blair on this topic,266 at most a few appear to involve 
manipulations that were measured using dependent variables that have 
direct real-world analogues. Furthermore, none of the manipulations 
appear to have been designed to include elements common to situations 
that produce litigation or the legal system within which such litigation 
is resolved. Similarly, in their review, Olson and Fazio distinguish 
between studies that attempt to de-bias participants with manipulations 
that change the construal or salient category of the object of the attitude 
or take advantage of the malleability of the attitudes themselves from 
those that target and seek to change the underlying cognitive 
associations themselves.267 However, the studies reviewed do not 
appear to take advantage of manipulations that could be categorized as 
“system” variables. 
To the extent that the remedies perspective captures the cause of the 
gap between law and science of discrimination, psychologists can help 
 
265 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 47–48 (2006). 
266 Blair, supra note 252. 
267 Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing Automatically Activated Racial 
Prejudice Through Implicit Evaluative Conditioning, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 421, 422–23 (2006). 
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close the gap by attending to the system-estimator distinction in 
laboratory work, then undertaking systematic efforts to field test 
interventions based on system variables that moderate implicit bias. 
Without this work, before judges recognize a right to be free from non-
purposeful discrimination, they must not only be able to appreciate the 
harm, but must be willing to commit to undertake or oversee this 
intervention development work themselves. It is not impossible to 
imagine a judge who is so motivated to address implicit bias that he or 
she would do this. But considering that researchers at the intersection 
of the law and psychology of discrimination have not yet done so 
themselves—such a judge would have to be fairly extraordinary. 
Relying upon the good fortune of having one’s case assigned to such a 
judge is generally not a winning litigation strategy. Accordingly, the 
Article next turns to possible approaches for addressing remedies 
concerns about implicit bias that can be taken in support of or as an 
alternative to further development of the relevant social science and 
thus, perhaps, present viable strategies for closing the gap in 
antidiscrimination law and psychology. 
B. Alternative Remedies Strategies 
The first set of options for addressing remedies concerns involves 
structuring litigation and remedies requests in order to minimize the 
need for extensive court involvement in addressing implicit bias. One 
seemingly obvious way to do this is with substitutionary damages. 
Courts are used to awarding damages and doing so generally requires 
little oversight after an award is issued. Aside from ease of 
administrability, damage awards would theoretically internalize the 
costs of defendants’ biased behavior thereby encouraging them to 
explore and potentially develop practical ways to address implicit 
bias.268 Moreover, because monetary awards can be awarded 
collectively and distributed pro rata, they have the advantage of 
offering a way to accommodate probabilistic harm of the sort that 
implicit bias may produce.269 Because social science is conducted at a 
 
268 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 463 (2001); see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting 
Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 
719 (2003). 
269 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 317 (1991). This is also possible as a statutory remedy. See, e.g., 
Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: 
Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121, 123 (2002). 
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group level but legal cases concern particular individuals, it is 
impossible to say with certainty how much implicit bias impacts a 
particular judgment in a given case.270 It is theoretically possible, 
however, to estimate the probabilistic impact of implicit bias on the 
members of a group or class. In this way, just as courts are able to 
recognize and award damages for probabilistic harm, such as the loss 
of likelihood to recover in medical malpractice cases,271 courts could 
award damages in the amount of the expected value of lost income 
corresponding to the estimated impact of defendants’ implicit biases on 
the plaintiffs.272 
Substitutionary damages may, however, ultimately be unacceptable 
or undesirable if they are too broad in scope. One of the characteristic 
concerns of the Court in McCleskey and Dukes was the expansive 
nature of the alleged problem and, by implication, the required 
intervention. By carefully structuring litigation around narrow contexts 
that are functionally defined in ways that maximize the probability that 
the defendants’ implicit biases impacted their decisions, parties may be 
able to reduce or eliminate such concerns. Classes that target 
discretionary decision-making in general may implicate too many 
situations to seem acceptable or enable reasonable inferences from 
existing theory. Cases that focus on disparities in a specific decision 
context within an organization may be tailored such that their scope 
aligns with factors that theory suggests are likely to exacerbate implicit 
bias: Decisions based on subjective standards, made by managers who 
know one another, using inadequate information, under time pressure, 
about people whose demographic characteristics are not consistent with 
those of individuals who stereotypically occupy that role.273 By 
defining a small putative class with geographic, institutional, and 
domain or role specificity and emphasizing the relevance of research 
on the specific situations under which implicit bias is most likely to 
operate, litigants could thus limit and respond to concerns that a finding 
 
270 David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert 
Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 419 (2014). 
271 See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 372 (2000) (recognizing decreases in 
probability of recovery as an injury under “loss of chance” doctrine). 
272 See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., When Bias is Implicit, How Might We Think About 
Repairing Harm?, 6 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 183, 186–87 (2015) (proposing use of 
alternative remedial frameworks for harm suffered as a result of implicit bias, based upon 
the superfund, emissions trading, and insurance models). 
273 Girvan et al., supra note 73; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ch. 18 (2002). 
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of liability would commit the courts to addressing the phenomenon of 
implicit bias writ large. 
Further, courts may be concerned that, if practical, effective 
interventions for implicit bias are lacking, money damages will simply 
push the remedies considerations further down the road. If implicit bias 
is pervasive and not abatable, the same defendants are likely to be 
brought back to court every year or two for essentially the same thing. 
Moreover, in certain contexts, such as jury selection and the death 
penalty, it may be impossible to determine how much to award and to 
whom it should go to. 
In such circumstances, or to the extent that equitable remedies in the 
form of injunctions against implicit bias are otherwise desirable or 
necessary, parties may also be able to address remedies concerns by de-
emphasizing the need for the court to award particular equitable relief 
now. When faced with a socially desirable activity that creates a 
permanent nuisance (i.e., one for which there is no available solution) 
courts have balanced the harms by issuing injunctions against 
defendants and then staying the injunctions to allow the defendants 
time to develop a practical solution.274 In cases involving non-
purposeful discrimination, a similar proposal could incentivize a 
defendant to use the insights and recommendations from laboratory 
research to develop their own intervention while alleviating the judges’ 
concern that nothing can be done. 
A second set of options involve procedural mechanisms that take 
remedies considerations out of the hands of the judges who are making 
liability decisions. It may be possible to do this by, for example, 
requiring strict adherence to a liability and remedies phase in which the 
former must be determined conclusively, including any appeals, before 
the trial court begins work on the latter. Separating the phases only in 
the trial court, while more procedurally expedient, would leave 
appellate courts faced with the same potential for remedies concerns to 
impact substantive judgments. 
A final, and perhaps the most fruitful, approach may be to rely upon 
the voluntary efforts of the parties themselves to develop viable 
solutions. Although judges may be unwilling to find defendants liable 
for non-purposeful discrimination in disparate treatment cases, if a 
claim can be stated for purposeful discrimination, any settlement of the 
claim, including potential consent decrees, may include steps targeted 
 
274 Robert Allen Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 
RUTGERS L. REV. 639, 717–18 (1962). 
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towards reducing implicit bias.275 In a similar vein, where courts are 
unwilling to create duties to address implicit bias, parties may negotiate 
them in advance. Thus, unions, for example, may insist on provisions 
protecting their members from non-purposeful discrimination and 
develop processes and remedies to be used when these provisions are 
violated. Indeed, the graduate students at the University of Washington 
appear to have done just that by negotiating protections against subtle 
forms of racism and sexism into their collective bargaining 
agreement.276 In combination with grievance provisions and other 
mechanisms, such as arbitration clauses, parties may thus require 
institutions to proactively explore ways to reduce implicit bias based 
upon contractual obligations rather than relying upon Constitutional or 
statutory antidiscrimination law. 
CONCLUSION 
Among the central observations of scholars working at the 
intersection of psychology and law is that judges regularly make 
assumptions about human behavior but rarely evaluate those 
assumptions against available scientific research. Where the 
assumptions are accurate, this tendency is perhaps benign. Where there 
is a gap between the legal doctrine and our best empirical 
 
275 See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 
478 U.S. 501, 522–23 (1986) (“[I]t is the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of 
the law upon which the complaint was originally based, that creates the obligations 
embodied in a consent decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress placed in § 
706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose obligations on employers or unions to 
remedy violations of Title VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are created 
by a consent decree.”); United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2002) (enforcing 
a consent decree even though under subsequent statute the EPA would not have been able 
to get a similar verdict); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 189 (2016) (“Under a consent decree, 
a party can agree to greater obligations than could be achieved if the suit were to go to trial; 
however, a consent decree cannot oblige a party to perform illegal conduct. The entry of a 
consent judgment is inappropriate and the judgment itself is unenforceable when the 
agreement it encompasses or the relief it grants is illegal or inconsistent with the law 
underlying the agreement. An agreement underlying a consent decree may be held void as 
contrary to public policy if it is clearly contrary to what the constitution, the statutes, or the 
decisions of the courts have declared to be the public policy or if it is manifestly injurious 
to the public welfare. Nevertheless, a court is not barred from entering a consent decree 
merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a 
trial, even where the court might lack authority under the governing statute to do so after a 
trial.”). 
276 Peter Schmidt, Campaigns Against Microaggressions Prompt Big Concerns About 
Free Speech, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 9, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/article          
-content/231459/. 
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understanding, however, this failure can threaten the accuracy, 
consistency, and legitimacy of the legal system. Identifying these gaps 
and advancing a normative justification for an evidence-based 
jurisprudence is a critical first step. It is also important to figure out 
why they persist and what it needed in order to close them. 
Focusing on the gap between the law of discrimination and 
contemporary psychological science of implicit bias, there is reason to 
believe that, among the primary reasons judges refuse to conform the 
law to the science is a concern about the remedies implications of using 
the civil legal system to address subtle, pervasive sources of 
discrimination. To the extent that this is true, it implies that advancing 
research and testimony about the implicit bias and the injuries that 
likely result from it will have limited impact, and, depending upon the 
scope, may even be counterproductive. Instead, advocates for 
expanded antidiscrimination rights should work to actively adopt 
strategies that limit or address remedies concerns. Further, it suggests 
that the there is an urgent need for psychologists to develop and test 
practical interventions for reducing implicit bias that can directly 
alleviate a judicial concern that, when it comes to implicit bias, there is 
nothing that can be done. In this way, psychologists and lawyers may 
be able to place injury from implicit bias within antidiscrimination 
law’s grasp. 
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APPENDIX A 
CASES REJECTING IMPLICIT BIAS 
Case Explanation 
Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young 
Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the U.S., 
34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 
2014) 
The court held that “[the plaintiffs] 
cannot use [Dr. Greenwald’s] 
opinions to support their intentional 
discrimination claims, since Dr. 
Greenwald’s opinions speak only to 
the question of implicit, or hidden, 
bias—not intentional acts.” 
Pippen v. State, 854 N.W.2d 1, 8 
(Iowa 2014) 
The court affirmed judgment of the 
trial court against plaintiffs who sued 
the State of Iowa for discriminatory 
hiring practices in its executive 
branch, holding that evidence of 
pervasive implicit bias as described by 
expert witnesses was not sufficient to 
find that discrimination had occurred. 
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, 
LLC, No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 
4232600, at *9 (W.D. Penn. July 13, 
2015) 
“Where, as here, a plaintiff asserts a 
disparate treatment claim, he or she 
must ‘prove that intentional 
discrimination occurred at th[e] 
particular [employer], not just that 
gender stereotyping or intentional 
discrimination is prevalent in the 
world.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., No. 6:01–CV–339–KKC, 2010 
WL 583681, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 
2010). 
State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 102 
(Minn. 2009) 
“Martin argues that the district court 
should be alert for a prosecutor’s 
subconscious, implicit bias, in 
addition to the more obvious and 
explicit purposeful discrimination. 
Martin does not cite to any cases that 
support his argument that the district 
court should look to implicit, in 
addition to explicit, bias in Batson 
challenges, nor does he detail how a 
court should investigate implicit bias. 
Our case law under Batson is well 
established. We see no reason to 
extend existing law to include 
‘implicit bias.’” (citations omitted). 
GIRVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2016  12:38 PM 
420 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 359 
Case Explanation 
State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 
341 (Wash. 2013) 
On appeal from a conviction of felony 
murder, the defendant alleged that the 
prosecution’s peremptory strike of a 
Black juror was motivated by implicit 
bias. The court agreed that implicit 
bias is endemic and that something 
ought to be done with the peremptory 
strike rules in voir dire, but declined 
to establish a new set of rules because 
no new rules had been suggested by 
the appellant. The court also believed 
new rules should be written by the 
rules committee, not the court. 
United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 
258–61 (6th Cir. 2015) 
The court recognized that implicit bias 
in jury selection could be aroused 
with the use of the word “felon.” But 
it found that the word was used in voir 
dire in order to dismiss jurors who 
would be prejudiced by the term. 
Additionally, the term was stipulated 
to as a fact of the case by both parties. 
The court did not introduce implicit 
bias into its doctrine, but accepted its 
use in voir dire. 
State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 191 
(2014) 
The court held here that the social 
scientific evidence of implicit bias 
presented by the defendant to show 
discriminatory sentencing for his 
conviction was not “exceptionally 
clear proof” that the discrimination in 
this case was purposeful.  
Burrell v. Cty. of Santa Clara, No. 
11–CV–04569–LHK, 2013 WL 
2156374, at *34 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 
2013) 
The court found that evidence of the 
existence of implicit bias was still 
evidence to show that a particular 
employment practice of the defendant 
had a disparate impact on the Black 
plaintiffs.  
Acosta v. Huppenthal, No. CV 10–
623–TUC–AWT, 2013 WL 871892, 
at *15 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2013) 
Students and teachers made a claim of 
unconstitutionality of an Arizona 
statute banning race-related education 
in public schools. The court held that 
evidence of implicit bias was 
insufficient to show intentional 
discrimination by lawmakers and state 
officials against Latinos.  
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APPENDIX B 
CASES ACCEPTING IMPLICIT BIAS 
Case Explanation 
Samaha v. Wash. State Dep’t of 
Transp., No. CV–10–175–RMP, 
2012 WL 11091843, at *4 (E.D. 
Wash. Jan. 3, 2012) 
Plaintiff of Arab descent sues 
employer for discrimination and calls 
on Dr. Anthony Greenwald as expert 
witness on implicit bias in the 
workplace. The court held that Dr. 
Greenwald’s demonstrated expertise in 
the area of implicit bias and 
discrimination meant his testimony 
would be admissible despite his lack of 
statement on the relation of his 
knowledge to the facts of the case. 
Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce 
Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 778 
(E.D. Wis. 2010) 
The court ruled in favor of Black male 
employee of the Wisconsin 
Department of Workforce 
Development who alleged 
discrimination is the dispersion of pay-
raises by his supervisor. The decision 
was not based on evidence of implicit 
bias, but the court cited evidence of 
implicit bias in the supervisor’s 
behavior as complimentary evidence to 
the plaintiff’s claim, implying that 
such evidence could be considered in 
claims under Title VII. 
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APPENDIX C 
CONCURRENCES, DISSENTS, OR IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF IMPLICIT 
BIAS 
Case Explanation 
State v. Sherman, No. 97840, 2012 
WL 3765041, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 30, 2012) (Stewart, P.J., 
concurring) 
“[T]he disparity in sentencing of 
these individuals who are so 
similarly situated, save race or 
ethnicity, at least requires 
consideration of what impact 
unconscious preferences or biases 
may have played in the disparity.” 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 939 
N.E.2d 735, 766–70 (2010) (Ireland, 
J., concurring) 
Here a defendant appealed his 
conviction. The court held that his 
rights had not been curtailed by the 
trial court allowing jurors to remain 
on the jury who might have been 
implicitly biased against the 
defendant. The concurring opinion 
noted that implicit bias could have 
been better explored in the 
proceeding and would have been 
helpful to coming to a conclusion.  
State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 96 
(Conn. 2015) (Norcott, J., 
concurring) 
In a case concerning capital 
punishment, the concurrence 
specifically discussed the racial 
disparities of capital punishment, 
writing that “[i]t likely is the case 
that many, if not most, of the 
documented disparities in capital 
charging and sentencing arise not 
from purposeful, hateful racism or 
racial animus, but rather from these 
sorts of subtle, imperceptible biases 
on the part of generally well-meaning 
decision makers.” 
Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 
F. Supp. 2d 319, 327 (D. Mass. 2011) 
In this workplace discrimination 
case, the court found that it needed to 
give weight to all the factors that 
could lead to a conclusion that 
discrimination occurred. Among 
these factors, the judge writes that 
new knowledge of implicit bias is 
best served by an examination of the 
totality of the circumstances. 
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Case Explanation 
Wells-Griffin v. St. Xavier Univ., 26 
F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
A former Black employee of the 
university claimed workplace 
discrimination against her former 
employer. The court implied an 
acceptance of implicit bias theory 
when it considered whether there was 
evidence to support the contention 
that racial stereotypes played a role 
in Wells-Griffin’s treatment at work. 
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